Willy Chong

How the Chinese Canadians became involved in the Burma Campaign
by Willy Chong

"All the Chinese-Canadian volunteers, whether in Sarawak or Malaya, had served well. All had gone to war as light-hearted young men, eager to make the best of their assignments with out a care for the morrow. In volunteering for clandestine warfare, the spirit of adventure was as evident in them as it had been in those Canadians who went into occupied Europe. But for the young Chinese-Canadians, their service meant something more. For them, it was also an affirmation of equality. Their parents or even grandparents, as well as themselves, had been second class Canadians, deprived of the full privileges of citizenship. They were ready, even eager, to fill all the obligation of citizenship so that in return they receive all those rights which other Canadians took for granted. Sarawak and Malaya were two exotic way stations on their route to full Canadian equality"

Because they often speak the local languages and blend in the local populations, Chinese-Canadians played a primary role in S.O.E.`s Asian operations The Chinese people had spread throughout southeast Asia for centuries and were established as hard-working merchants and trader. For this reason, Chinese-Canadians were actively recruited by S.O.E. in 1943 and 1944. IT was dramatic switch for the Chinese-Canadians who up until then been prevented from playing any role in the defense of their new country.

1947 All people, First Nation, Chinese. Eskimo, as a Canadian now have full privileges of citizenship. Willy Chong

When you asked for operations in Singapore, you mean a plane flew over your island and agents parachuted at night into Singapore. It never happened, it was too dangerous. If they did there would be a code name like Gustavus 1 or 2 or 30, . there are no records. There are many drops into south Johore, they would remove their green uniform then put on their civics and travel by bus, car or by train, I heard of an agent swimming across Johore Straight.

Only time Force 136 entered into Singapore on September 3 and 4. Colonel A Stewart was the senior allied officer who marched into Singapore with my friend Billy Lee. These two are Canadian men who live in this city, they raised the Union Jack over the camp and several major Singapore buildings.

You asked, If I lived through the occupation, I have to say no. I was never under occupation, I hope I have helped you.

FORCE 136

Force 136, created on March 16th 1944 by Special Operation Executive, was a British paramilitary organization set up in India and Ceylon, F136 composed of multi-National Allied military personnal working behind enemy lines. It`s objectives were to gather important information on enemy movement and to organize local underground resistance groups to disrupt enemy communication and supply lines. The role and duties of this unit were similar to previous SOE operation in Europe against the Germans. Canadians would also serve with the famous M.I.9 Unit (British Military intelligence Group 9) which operated in enemy occupied Europe and the Far East helping those behind enemy lines escape and bringing aid to POW`s at the wars end.

S.O.E./Force 136, composed of personnal from Allied / Resistance Forces and included Chinese Canadians who were trained and led by British commanders in India and Ceylon and operated in Burma and Malaya. Another group of Chinese was known as “Operation Oblivion” in the S.O.E. organization, they were stationed in Australia and operated in Sarawak (Area North of Borneo). The Chinese Canadians were recruited for these missions, because they could speak and write Chinese as well as English and could blend in with the local inhabitants who were mostly Chinese origin.

The 1950 movie, “Bridge Over the River Kwai,” gave a good description of what the para-military personnel of Force 136 did. The movie showed not only how the mission was carried out in blowing up the “ bridge” but depicted the type of training these men received and the difficult task they had in hiking through thick jungle, back packing heavy loads of plastic explosives, radio transmitters and food supplies, to reach their target without being detected.

The role of the SOE and its personnel in Force 136 was different from the other organizations like M.I.6. (Secret Intelligence Service.) Many compare SOE with “agents” of MI6 (SIS) when in truth, SOE was a para-military organization developed to aid and assist resistance around the globe, intelligence gathering was also done but not in the same fashion as those plain clothed spy`s ‘agents’ being utilized by MI6, SOE in the Far East did not start serious offensive operations until the Japanese had suffered serious set backs. Once it was determined by SOE ( Who began operating in the Far East before the Japanese onslaught in 1941/42) that Allied Forces could effectively work with the indigeonous resistance available, F136 was created and utilized effectively against the enemy, organizing underground resistance groups to disrupt enemy supply lines carrying out information gathering on enemy movements and eventually mounting small scale offensive operations against the Japanese

Men in Force 136 had their espionage training in various parts in India and Ceylon. They learned how to set-up plastic explosives and how to handle and use detonators and “time pencils” for setting off charges in specific times. They trained how to scout and how best to approach an enemy camp or ammunition dump to sabotage installations without being detected. To keep in contact with headquarters, wireless operation and Morse code training, including coding messages in a Chinese wording code system, were also a part of the course. On completion of this tactical training, which included hand to hand combat and use of light weapons, these men received parachute training on the ground and in the air. This latter phase was required in order to drop them behind enemy lines. However, if the drop off is near shores, landings from submarines were employed.

Members of Force 136 normally operated in groups of 8, with each being a specialist in his party. Besides the No. 1 and No 2. commanders, there were 2 demolition experts, a wireless operator, a coder/decoder and two Gurkhas scouts. Each man has his own assignment and it was most important that everyone operated as a team, because the success of the operation depended solely on it. It was also important not to get caught by the enemy, as it would mean certain painful death. They have issued 2 “L” pills, when chewed on will kill within seconds ,because this group has this secret “ Q” code that they wanted very much. When parachute out at 700 feet in the dark carrying 50 lb. It could be very dangerous, if you hurt yourself seriously, you will be left behind with your 2 “L” pills

At war`s end in South East Asia, the role and duties of Force 136 were changed. The groups were instructed to control the immediate disengagement of the Japanese army in their respective areas prevent the guerrilla groups from taking revenge on the Japanese surrendering troops, and care for the released Allied prisoners of war until the arrival of Allied forces. Although the men in Force 136 were small in number, their contribution played a big role in the outcome of the war in South East Asia and they were given high recognition by the British and Canadian government at the end of the war. By Willie Chong ex-F136

They were listed on our operations orders simply as so many “bodies ”,to be dropped, along with so many containers, at such and such a geographical spot, at an exact moment, on a specific night, or day. One night, it might be the hills or plains of Burma, the next, perhaps a tiny clearing in the steaming jungle of Malaya, yet the next again, possibly a paddy field in French Indo-China, or the outskirts of a bamboo-thicketed community in Siam.

A few moments before take-off our “bods” would be hurried up to our aircraft in a covered van, There might be a terse greeting between bods and aircrew. Hours, many hundreds of miles, and perhaps a word or two later, we would parachute them into the night as silently and as mysteriously as they had originally appeared at our aircraft`s side. We were pretty close to the DZ now. This was only the second flight to this area. Alverson had taken us over to a distinctive landmark on the east coast and from there we were doing a timed run to the spot, designated only by latitude and longitude, where the “reception party” was to be waiting.

The second navigator, Pilot Officer Harry Walling, now acting as “bomb-aimer”, was in the aircraft`s nose to guide the drop, the bomb doors were open, ready to spew out the containers, and our passenger was perched on the slide awaiting the bomb-aimer`s signal that would sendthem shooting into space, into the night, to an uncertain landing below.

Now, according to our calculations, we were directly over the designated dropping area. But instead of a series of lights laid out on the ground, as, back at base, we had been told to expect, or a certain letter flashed at us by aldis lamp, there was nothing but pitch black darkness.We had come nearly 2,000 miles and most of it over water, through thunderstorm, at night. In the tropics, thunderstorms (cumulo-nimbus cloud) climb to tremendous heights and then centers are particularly violent.

On such a long operation at this - at that time, the longest in that theatre of war - we did not have enough fuel to climb over storms, and we would never have survived trying to get through. We skipped along just before cloud base, or about 250 feet off the water. It was unbelievably dark and only when lightning flashed could we see where cloud left off and blinding rain began.

This went on for hours, and while it was a bit nerve-racking for all of us, it was a real test for navigator Alverson. He had no radio aids, and some 30,000-40,000 feet of cloud were between him and a sight of the sky, where either sun, moon or stars could have helped him. So he resorted to flame floats - flares which, tossed from the aircraft, ignited when they hit the water. With our tail-gunner, Pilot Officer Jack Tyson, sighting on them with his guns, Alverson could translate the apparent drift of the aircraft with respect to the float into approximate wind direction and speed, and combing those factors with our compass direction and airspeed, calculate where we were and where we should be.

Working tirelessly over his maps and charts for hours, in cramped quarters and tossed about endlessly, Alverson brought us out right on the nose. And here we were over the dropping zone, and no one in sight. It could be that somewhere the signals had got mixed , perhaps this was neither the place, the night nor the hour, Perhaps the party below had been surprised by the enemy and wiped out. Perhaps they had suddenly learned that the Japanese had got wind of what was going on, and, without having time to radio back to headquarters, had called off the reception. Perhaps - perhaps we were not over the right spot. After all, it was, typically, only a tiny clearing in the jungle - easy to miss - and it was so dark nothing could be picked out below.

Back the few miles to the east coast we went, then did a timed run in once more. Six minutes, five minutes, four, three, two, one, zero - and there were the lights! They were laid out just as called for.

Besides being identification, they told the direction in which we were to drop and hinted at the size of the dropping area. The letter of the alphabet blinked from the ground also checked. All signals had to be in order before a drop was made. One crew completed a 3,000 mile flight but refused to drop because the aldis signal was one letter out.

As we throttled back, gently getting down to the 700 feet above ground from whichbods were parachuted, our bod, armed to the teeth and apparently serenely confident we were going to drop them just wherethey should be going, awaited the bomb-aimer`s signal that would send them on their way.

The way out was via a slide similar to that found in children`s playgrounds or at swimming pools, but many times more slippery, It was rigged up in the rear of our Lib-vulgarly referred to as “the pregnant whale” because of it`s bulky, underslung appearancefacing to the tail and leading to an escape hatch in the floor.

Our bod - an English army officer - sat on the slid, his legs over the edges and holding on with his hand, Our dispatcher stood by him. Suddenly the red warning light, just above the slide but flashed by the bomb-aimer up in the nose, went on. This was the alert. Only a matter of moments now and everyone had to be ready - an quick. We were down so low, travelling so fast, and with only a tiny space into which to drop our mysterious friends - a fraction of a second could spell success or failure Suddenly, we were there.

Up in the nose, as though he was dropping a bomb, the bomb-aimer pressed a button. The green light at the “toboggan slide’’ flashed and our wireless operator-dispatcher, Flight Sergeant Gene Zimmerman, whacked our bod over the back. Out they shot. Another time around, this time down to 500 feet to drop the supply containers hung on racks designed for bombs, and our job was done.

Out went the lights on the ground, and back home - nearly 2,000 miles away - we headed. Down below, our former passenger was being greeted by the men with whom he would share the dangerous job ahead.

A brief radio message next day from deep in the jungle stating whether the drop had been successful or not - a message always awaited with keen interest, even anxiety - was the last we heard. However, the enemy heard plenty.

We were working with what literally amounted to a secret army spread throughout all enemy-occupied southeast Asia: a secret army which was organizing friendly natives: spying and reporting back important intelligence, arranging (through outfits like ours) air-drops of supplies to this secret army, ambushing enemy convoys, blowing bridges and directing air attacks on Japanese troop concentrations, munition dumps and supply depots. They even organized landings of allied aircraft deep within enemy occupied territory to pick up refugees, their own wounded and enemy prisoners.

These people - English, American, Chinese Canadians, French, Indian, Burmese, Siamese, Malayan - did a wonderful job, and it was a privilege - and an honour to work with them.

Our squadron was based at a small village, Jessore, just outside Calcutta, It comprised three flights single - engine Lysanders, for the short but hazardous hops into Burma, twin - engine Dakotas which took their loads further away, to French Indo-China and Siam, and even landed there on occasion, and our, the Liberator flight, for the very long-range, non stop missions even further into French Indo-China and Siam, and to Malaya.

As the war ended, most of the air crew were Canadian, almost all had been trained at Boundary Bay, British Columbia. Our commanding officer was a famous RAF “type”, Wing Commander L,M. Hodges, D.S.O. and Bar. DFC and Bar, Croix de Guerre, etc.

Roger Cheng and the following Chinese Canadians landed by Catalina Flying Boat, 6 August 1945. They were originally sent to SOE for operation “Oblivion”, they were to operate with Chinese Communists in South China. The operation was canceled because General Douglas MacArthur wanted to have the South East Asia command to be an all American operation. Operation “Oblivion” was under the direct control of the British war ministry and it`s role was under the direct command of Prime Minister Winston Churchill

Of the 350 SOE personnel dropped into Malaya between June and August 1945 , 14 would be Canadian Chinese .

All the French Canadian’s listed as serving in the Far East were volunteers from Buckmasters “F” section SOE. Most of these personnel were initially trained at STS (Special Training School) in Canada , Camp X (STS 103) , Massingham Algeria and also at various STS in the UK and Commando Schools in Scotland. They would later train in India and Ceylon.

150 Chinese Canadians were sent to the Far East out of hundreds who volunteered for special assignment, many of these would end up as qualified parachutists. They were initially trained at a makeshift School in the Okanagan Valley in BC , Canada , then they were off in separate groups at different times to train in Australia , India and Ceylon. Of the 150 , 14 would see action . The remainder trained and prepared themselves for their turn , however the war with Japan would end before they could be involved.

The original group of Chinese Canadians were known as the Kendall group ( Maj. Kendall) who recruited them in Canada were only trained in BC Okanagan Valley . This consisted of some of those chosen for operation "Oblivion" approx. 15 persons, the mission was cancelled .

The later group recruited by Maj Legg was sent to England and then to India for training approx. 125 persons. A few were sent directly to Australia .

Information compiled by Ken Joyce from National Archives of Canada records and through the book by Maclaren , Roy “Canadians Behind Enemy Lines 1939-1945” University of British Columbia Press , 1981.

This chapter is taken out of the excellent book – The Dragon and the Maple Leaf by Marjorie Wong - Page 172

The all Canadian team of Tideway Green was dropped on 5 of August to Campbell Miles`s reception committee in the north Johore. The team was led by Maj. Joe H.A. Benoit and included Sgt. Kim Wing (Ernie) Louie. K5163 interpreter, who spoke Cantonese. Ernie had completed his training when he joined the team at Horana. Benoit`s 2 i/c, Capt. John E. Hanna, who spoke Mandarin, and Capt. Roger M. Caza, wireless operator, were dropped to the team two days later.

They remained at base for about five days and then set out on what was supposed to be a three day trip through the jungle. Some of the equipment and kit had to be discarded to lighten the loads. The trip lasted a nightmarish seven days as they tramped 85 miles through swamps and dense jungle. It rained for full three days and their boots disintegrated. They were only retain only items necessary for their survival because of lack of carriers.

Some of the guerrillas were accustomed to leading new arrivals through the thickest and swampiest jungle. Many teams never knew the precise locations of guerrilla camps, but the guerrillas were always aware of the team locations. The guerrillas often mounted skeleton guards on the patrol liaison team camps. Ostensibly as protection against enemy attack. Tideway Green never learned the location of the guerrilla camp in their area.

A DZ. Adequate for food and stores was soon located but it was unsuitable for personnel. The food shortage both among the guerrillas and the Malays was very bad. On 17 August the were ordered to take no action and remain at their base, Then on the 20 th. They were instructed to search out POW camp and report their condition to base.

The first drop of bulk food, including rice and dried fish, was received for the guerrillas. The wireless set was became unusable. Another drop of food and replacement parts for the wireless set was made on 24 August, but this time the food was for members of the team.

At the end of the month, an Australian captain and corporal jumped to a reception committee of Ernie Louie and John Hanna. The two had searched out the DZ, for the parachutists since the guerrillas had refused to locate it. They had doggedly tramped through the area by compass marching and discovered a DZ. they considered reasonably safe about six miles away.

The Japanese surrendered before there was need to go into action, the Benoit team was to have blocked the road north Johore area for the code name ZIPPER invasion.

Batu Pahat and at nearby Kluang three days later, they found 900 POW in addition, twelve Indian escapees, as well as one British and three American, reported to the team.

These former PWOs were transferred to British military authorities in Singapore. For the POWs at Kluang, contact was made with the Japanese authorities and food and medicine drops were organized for the relief. Arrangement were then made for their repatriation between 12 and 14 September.

The guerrillas were becoming unwilling to cooperate now and the team had to deal with the inevitable conflict between the Malays and the Chinese. The team was forced to request help from the British Army in Singapore in order to restrain the Malays who allegedly had killed two hundred Chinese at Batu Pahat. The Chinese requested immediate help since some killing was still going on and house were being burned.

In mid-September, Hanna and Louie were posted in Muar, and the team itself moved into the town on 21 September, After the month at Muar, on 18 October, they turned over control to the British Officer but they continued their police and civil administration duties until they left Malaya 12 November. Ernie Louie traveled to Meerut, and others went to Columbo.

Galvanic Brown, led by Maj. Ian A. Macdonald, a rubber planter who spoke Malay, was dropped 24 July, with Capt. M.G. Levy his 2 i/c. The wireless operator was Sgt. Tom R. Henney, and Sgt. Hinn Wing (Henry) Fung, code named Kale, K5224, From Vancouver, was the interpreter. Two members of E. Group were included in the drop.

The plane started out on the 20^th. But the pilot was forced to return because of a malfunction. It took six hours flying to get rid of the gasoline that could not be jettisoned, before they could safety land. They started out again on the 22^nd and their drop was completed without further mishap.

The Galvanic Brown team was dropped to a blue reception committee north of Kuala Lumpur. They set out for their camp near Kajang, a trip that took nearly a week, The camp was south of Kuala Lumpur close to the guerrilla regiment. They had no sooner set up camp than they were forced to move because of a Japanese patrol rapidly nearing their location and the guerrilla moved with them.

Food and medical drops were made and they set about giving what medical help they could. Macdonald was briefed to report on the rubber and tin situation.

After the surrender the group entered Kajang but the Japanese stationed here refused to discuss surrender until the British army arrived.

The team was able to diffuse hostilities between the MPAJA (Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army) and collaborators as well as to maintain control of the Japanese and ward off bandits until an Indian Army detachtment arrived 9/10 September and the team moved into Kuala Lumpur. Macdonald was please with Henry Fung who was the first of the Chinese Canadians to volunteer for operations in Malaya. Henry was “a great success with the guerrilla and always cheerful to do any amount of work asked of him”.

This particular team lived with the guerrilla and seem to have established an excellent rapport with them. The wives and children of the MPAJA were also sheltered in the camp and made clothing for their men from bolts of cloth dropped by Force 136, most of the men were too small for standard issue clothing. It is possible that the three star worn on the sleeve by Henry Fung indicates that this item also was made by one of the ladies in the camp.

Galvanic Green PTL was dropped 28 July to a reception party at Kerling in Selangor.

Maj. C,E, Maxwell led the team with a lieutenant, a sergeant, and two Nationalist Chinese wireless operators, and Sgt. Bing Lee Chinn. K5161 from Vancouver, code-named Haricot, the interpreter.

Maxwell was disappointed that Chinn was able to speak only the Cantonese dialect. The two Nationalist Chinese may have spoken Mandarin and little or no English so that communication with these might have been difficult. Unlike the Cantonese-speaking Canadian Chinese, the Chinese in Malaya were not all from the same area in China, although most came from the southern province. As a result there were several distinct spoken dialects. In spite of language problems, Bing Lee Chinn was able to interpret for most of the MPAJA with out difficulty.

By the time Maxwell`s group had set up camp, the Japanese had capitulated. The team immediately began providing medical assistance to the guerrillas who were suffering from beri- beri and skin ulcers and they also gave medical attention to those in Kuala Kubu Bahru. They used work parties of Japanese in Kuala Kuhru to clean up.

Galvanic State was dropped near Kuala Lumpur 28 July, under Capt. K. Robert Heine, his 2 i/c, Capt. Hugh Fraser, two wireless operators, and Sgt. Robert W, (BOB) Lew, K5677, code named Maize, interpreter, as well as a tracker dog that was killed on landing.

Slate was dropped to a guerrilla reception committee near Kuala Lipis, about 30 miles north of Kuala Lumpur. It took five days to reach their camp at Kachau, near Serendah.

Again, because of a Japanese patrol, they had to quickly and quietly leave camp. There was tension and anxiety as they slipped away unseen and unheard while the Japanese approached. The Japanese, on the other hand, never seemed to mount a serious campaign to winkle them out.

Broadhurst had distributed three of his teams north of Kuala Lumpur and the two others, Blue and Brown, to the east and south. The teams were instructed to establish secure bases quickly so that there would not be long lines of communication, the patrols were to set up camps in places where they could develop quickly and be prepared to go into action immediately.

Enemy pressure steadily increased during late July and early August as the Japanese probed into their positions with a frontal penetration, repulsed by a section of the Gurkha support group. If the Japanese had attacked at this point, the whole Selangor organization would have been jeopardized. There was no further Japanese action until fighting erupted between the MPAJA and the Japanese at Serendah on the 31 August.

The guerrillas at first had wanted Slate to be formed near Orange but lack of food in the area and increased enemy activity necessitated its move to the Kachau-Broga area, South of Brown. The move was not complete until after the Japanese capitulation.

On the Japanese surrender, Heine and Lew drove into Serendah: like Davis and Broadhurst at Kuala Lumpur, they were astonished to find a map on the walls of the garrison showing the location of most of the guerrilla camps.

The Slate team provided medical help to the Malays and the guerrillas who like the inhabitants generally, were suffering from lack of medical treatment. Bob Lew then traveled to Kuala Lumpur to join the others.

It was not until 22 August that a medical team of Capt. John Holman and his medical orderly, Sergeant Goodyer, as well as a British sergeant wireless operator, were added to the Selangor teams; they were dropped to a reception committee at Serendah. It had been planned to complete the drop of the additional Gurkha support groups during the August moon period but bodies were ‘frozen’ after the Japanese surrender.

John Davis moved from Perak to Selangor to join Broadhurst when the prospect of a Japanese surrender seemed imminent in mid-August. Bing Lee and Ted Wong were with Broadhurst when Davis joined the group.

When they moved to the headquarters camp near Serenadah. Davis and Broadhurst learned that the Japanese commander in Singapore, Gen. Itagaki Seishiro, intended to continue fighting. There was a tedious period while they waited for news of the surrender. By 24 August, the Japanese still had not replied to the surrender; instead they attacked the guerrillas in Serendah. Also during this period, there was a guerrilla attack on a Japanese convoy in south Perak, which did not help the tension. The fighting was stopped in Serendah by the personal intervention of Davis and Broadhurst.

Then they entered Kuaka Lumpur and contacted the Japanese governor of Selangor with regard the surrender. The Japanese officer in Kuala Lumpur, where some 6,000 Japanese troops were garrisoned, left some troops in Serendah to help keep the peace, but they insisted on waiting for the British Army to arrive before any formal surrender occur.

ON 31 August, Davis and Broadhurst moved into Kuala Lumpur to prevent further incidents. They established themselves in a Chinese house overlooking the race track where the guerrillas were encamped; they were thus able to keep watch over both the former enemy and the MPAJA allies.

Ugly situations developed: the guerrillas were hard to disband, and the Japanese refused to recognize the British connection with the guerrillas. Instructions had come from headquarters not to jeopardize the lives of prisoners by any kind of confrontation with the Japanese. Some 1,300 internees were located by the teams in a camp near Kachau in Selangor; wireless contact was immediately made with headquarters advising the number and location of this group. Since nothing further could be done in Kuala Lumpur, Davis and Broadhurst set out for Morib Beach for Operation Zipper.

At the time the British Army invaded on the 9 September, the guerillas were being used to prevent looting and lynchings and their health was improving with food supplies, transport, and quarters provided by the Japanese. Although General MacArthur had accepted the Japanese surrender on the 2 September in Tokyo Bay, British troops did not reach Kuala Lumpur until 13 September, the day following Mountbatten`s acceptance of the Japanese surrender of all troops in SEAC theatre at Singapore.

By the end of September the British military authority and Force 136 teams were disbanding and disarming the guerrillas. Bing Lee coded messages to Ceylon concerning the situation in Selangor. including information on the POW camps they had found. Both he and Ted Wong helped supervise Japanese work parties and with the help of guerrillas maintained the peace between the Chinese and Malayas. Assistance was also given to Australian Prisoners of War. At Serendah, the Japanese allowed the team to use the local police station and the hospital.