The following is a copy of the report in the SEAC souvenir newspaper published in the Autumn on 1945

THE 17 INDIAN DIVISION

CONCENTRATE in the Imphal area, move south through the Kabaw and Gangaw valleys behind 7 Indian Division pass through an Irrawaddy bridgehead formed by them and capture Meiktila.  Then hold it and destroy any Jap forces withdrawing from the north. These were the orders received in Ranchi at the end of December 1944. 

By the end of January, the Division. travelling incognito with its famous Black Cat signs no longer visible, had concentrated south of Imphal. In the record time of 8 days it had completely re-organized on a motor transport basis, except one brigade airborne. This would nor­mally take up to six months. 

The move south to the Irrawaddy was remarkable only for the few vehicle casualties incurred over 400 miles of terrible roads -with most of the drivers only half trained, and 50% of the vehicles classed three. 

On 18 Feb, Meiktila Force, 17 Div, and 255 Indian Tank Brigade, less one regiment. started to cross the Irra­waddy. At last it was out in front, and Meiktila only 80 miles ahead. By March. the Forces had, by means of enveloping movements, battered its way through enemy opposition over little more than bullock cart tracks, overrun the enemy L of C, captured innumerable dumps and several guns and the 100 guns of the divisional artillery were shelling Meiktila. Throughout this advance, the US. Nos. I and 2 Commando Groups, controlled by RAF VCP’s, had provided magnificent direct sup­port and gained the admiration and gratitude of all ranks. 

It took four days to capture Meik­tila., four days of bitter fighting against a fanatical enemy strongly supported by artillery and armed with an unusually high percentage of automatics; every one of them died where he stood. All arms were magnificent. Despite lack of practice together, the tanks of 255 and the infantry worked as one. Engineers were removing mines with the forward troops. Yard by yard the town was taken and held. 

What ensured victory was the rapidity with which the plan was implemented. The enemy was contained and attacked from all sides The speed and weight of these attacks prevented him from regrouping. But true to custom he stayed to fight and in four days over 2,000 were killed and 56 guns destroyed or captured. 

The capture of Meiktila was the greatest defeat the Japanese had suffered in S.E.AC - tactically and strategica1ly. Its bold conception was inspired by Fourteenth Army and 4 Corps, and it was successfully implemented by the Meiktila Force.  

For two to three weeks, the airfield was under heavy Jap attack and constant artillery fire. Transport aircraft could not land, and maintenance was by supply drop. But every day strong  tank and infantry columns were hitting out from Meiktila in all directions. Heavy casualties in men and guns were being inflicted. 

A brigade of 5 Indian Division arrived by air to release more 17 Div troops for offensive operations. They too came in for heavy shelling in the airstrip area. 

By The end of March. the Jap in this area was broken - he had lost 90% of his artillery and his morale was at a low ebb. A further 4,000 Japs and 70 guns had been destroyed or captured. 5 Indian Division was concentrated in Meiktila and on 3 April the Meiktila Force moved south towards Pyawbwe, against strong opposition by forces under the com­mander of 49 Division. 

In Pyawbwe severa1 strong points held firm till the last, but the Jap, surrounded on all sides by our tanks and infantry, was quicker to panic and try to get away than hitherto. Pyawbwe was a further major victory. 1000 Japs were killed and 13 guns accounted for. It completed the Jap disorganization  that had started at Meiktila. From there on the advance south was largely a pursuit. 

One incident during the advance - the most pleasing of the campaign, was the recovery of over 400 British and American prisoners of war. These included several Officers and men of the West Yorrkshire Regiment and KOYLI, and the former ADMS of the Division who had been taken prisoner in Burma in 1942. 

Pegu was a hard nut to crack but it was taken by determined attacks from the north, east and west. Early monsoon rains aggravated the difficulties, and with two bridges down between Pegu and Rangoon, the Division’s rapid advance was slowed down. 

On 6 May, our troops contacted 26 Indian Division troops at the Hiegu bridgehead. Though 17 Div had not reached Rangoon first, its share in the liberation of Burma must now be clear. It was fitting that the leading infantry, who linked up with 26 Div were the 7 Gurkha Rifles, who fired the div’s first shots against the Jap in Burma at Miyawadi in Jan 1942. 

Since then, the Division with regiments of 255 Indian Tank Brigade, has killed 9500 Japs and accounted for 212 guns and 15 tanks. 

On 6 May, the Division proudly put up their Black Cat again. With the decisive defeat of the Jap in these, and the Manipur operations, the Black Cats feel they have had full revenge for the losses sustained in the 1942 campaign. 

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