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CHAPTER V
Back to M.L.I. History contents THE REGIMENT IN THE WAR OF 1939.45
Assam and Burma
In the closing weeks of 1941, while the struggle in North Africa ebbed and flowed and while our forces in Syria and Northern Iran organized defences against a probable Nazi eruption into those countries from the direction of the Caucasus where the hard-pressed Red Armies were being forced east and south, a new and dangerous situation had arisen in Eastern Asia with the opening of hostilities by Tokyo and the all-conquering advance of the Japanese Armies in the spring and summer of 1942. Hong-Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Rangoon had been lost to the new enemy in quick succession and with their occupation of Upper Burma the Japanese, by the opening of the monsoon, were upon the Eastern Frontiers of India.
A hastily assembled force had been sent up to this little known borderland to hold open those few routes by which the exhausted Burma Army could complete its grim fighting retreat through the wild tangle of jungle-clad mountains into India. As part of this Eastern Army went the 4th Battalion from Baluchistan. In May 1942 this battalion arrived at Imphal, in the Manipur hills, to be followed four months later by the 6th Battalion from the North-West Frontier. This latter battalion being the first of the new war service battalions to be raised by the Regiment in accordance with the vast expansion of the Indian Army which had been taking place since 1939.
During the ensuing two and a half years these two battalions, as units of the 23rd Indian Division, remained constantly on active service in those wild remote hills of the Assam-Burma borderland. En this jungle-covered tangle of precipitous hills and deep valleys, some of the most difficult country in the world, they campaigned under most trying conditions of heat and cold through three monsoons in an area of the world’s heaviest known rainfall and endemic with the deadliest malaria.
Besides preparing defences against a probable enemy attempt to invade India by land the duties of the two battalions during the latter part of 1942 and throughout 1943 included deep patrolling into Japanese-occupied territory in the Kabaw and Upper Chindwin Valleys. These patrols, which often were of several weeks’ duration when the parties carried the minimum of rations and were dependent upon the sparsely inhabited country for subsistence, called not only for toughness and endurance from all ranks but for a very high standard of initiative and leadership on the part of the officers and N.C.Os. who led them. That these qualities were forthcoming was amply shown by the successful results achieved Wand the degree of superiority in jungle warfare obtained over the wily enemy. In the not infrequent patrol clashes the Mahratta more than held his own, although success was not achieved without loss and several fine young officers fell to the rifles of lurking enemy snipers lying in wait to pick off the patrol leaders.
For his outstanding gallantry during a night action near the village of Okkan in the Kabaw Valley, on l6th/llth February 1943 when the 4th Mahrattas covered the
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advance across the Chindwin of Brigadier Wingate’s first “Chindit” expedition, Lance-Naik Maruti Shinde was awarded a well-earned I.D.S.M. The Japanese, in superior force, pressed home a determined attack on his platoon, using bayonet and grenades and covered by mortar fire. The crew of the supporting Bren gun were killed, several men wounded, and the remainder driven in. Lance-Naik Maruti Shinde remained alone, 100 yards in advance of all support, coolly firing his tommy gun, inflicting casualties and holding up any further enemy infiltration. He remained in this isolated position for two hours until the situation was restored. It was due to this N.C.O’s complete disregard of personal danger that the entire platoon locality was not overrun, as the enemy diverted by him were in considerable strength.
The I.D.S.M. was awarded also to Havildar Abu Gosalkar for gallantry during the same action.
A sharp action was fought on 21st June 1943 when a small detachment of the 4th Mahrattas, under the command of Captain D. N. Pearson, in co-operation with a platoon of the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, made a raiding attack on the Japanese post at Yetagaun in the Atwin Yomas between the Kabaw Valley and the Chindwin. While the Mahrattas successfully engaged the attention of the Japanese by attacking frontally, the Highlanders penetrated the village from the rear. Severe casualties were inflicted on the surprised enemy, and documents of important intelligence value captured, before the force successfully withdrew in face of superior numbers.
Early in 1944 another war service battalion, the 17th, which for over two years since its raising at Belgaum in October 1941 had been training in Southern India, embarked from Madras for active service against the Japanese in Burma. Landing at Chittagong on 4th March 1944 as a unit of the 25th Indian Division, this battalion was quickly moved up to the Arakan sector of the long drawn Burma front and occupied positions in the Razabil area. Almost immediately the new battalion was involved in patrol clashes, in which casualties were both inflicted and sustained, later extended to heavy defensive fighting as the Japanese developed their abortive plan to encircle and destroy our forces covering the Eastern Bengal approaches to India.
On 5th April a strong force of Japanese and Jifs, with all supporting arms, opened a series of determined attacks on positions held by the 17th Mahrattas. The struggle continued throughout two days and nights of fierce attack and counter-attack, in leading one of which Major N. K. B. Dodge, the Second-in-Command, was killed at close quarters with the enemy, until finally, severe casualties having been inflicted and sustained, the Battalion was obliged to abandon its forward positions in face of superior force. It is a measure of the severity of the two days’ fighting that ‘B’ Company on withdrawal mustered no more than 26 men, but brought safely away eight of its nine Bren guns and all its 2-inch mortars. For outstanding examples of gallantry and leadership throughout these two days of very severe fighting Major R. B. Teal and Subedar Mohammed Umar were awarded the M.C.
While our forces in the Arakan were bloodily repulsing the enemy thrust towards Eastern Bengal the Japanese opened powerful thrusts into Manipur. This loudly vaunted “Invasion of India,” the initial success of which isolated Imphal and established a dangerous threat to the vitally important Assam railway system, led to the series of bitter battles
31 which, at Kohima and in the mountain approaches to Imphal, continued throughout the summer and monsoon of 1944 and resulted in the final ejectment and virtual destruction of the invading Japanese Army.
As units of the 23rd Indian Division, in the recently constituted Fourteenth Army commanded by Lieut.-General W. J. Slim, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., the opening of the Japanese offensive in the first week of March 1944 found the 4th and 6th Battalions occupying forward positions in the Ukhrul area west of the Upper Chindwin. Almost immediately the 6th Battalion was hurried off with the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade on urgent operations to cover the retirement of the 17th Indian Division which, cut off by the Japanese advance, was fighting its way back to Imphal from its isolated situation at Tiddim in the mountains 180 miles to the southward. In the course of these operations, during ensuing weeks, sub-units of the Battalion were engaged in a series of successful delaying actions while reconnaissance and fighting patrols, led with boldness and initiative by junior commanders, harassed the persistent efforts of the enemy to outflank and cut off our retiring troops. Casualties in this mountain warfare of ambush and stratagem were sustained but the enemy was made to pay a heavy price for the miles gained towards his objective—the upland plain and town of Imphal.
Naik Vishram Chawan, sent out with his section on 15th April to investigate reported enemy movement in the Thairolok village area, on contacting a Japanese patrol some 20 strong with other enemy in close support, immediately attacked regardless of the enemy’s superior strength, himself charging a Japanese light machine-gun group—killing the gun numbers and capturing the weapon, which the section brought away with them in the face of enemy efforts to retrieve it. For his gallant leadership in this dashing action, in which twelve enemy were killed for a loss to his own force of only two men wounded, Naik Vishram Chawan was awarded the I.D.S.M.
Meanwhile a serious situation had developed in the Ukhrul area to the east of Imphal where the 4th Battalion occupied positions in the way of a powerful Japanese column advancing on Imphal from bridgeheads on the Upper Chindwin near Homalin. This battalion, left behind in this area when the rest of the 23rd Indian Division moved elsewhere, now formed part of the 50th Independent Brigade, of which the remaining components were two recently formed Indian Parachute Battalions and the 15th Indian Mountain Battery, with the vital task of delaying the enemy advance while adequate forces were collected for the defence of Imphal. How it succeeded in its task—in which, owing to the relative inexperience of the Paratroops, a major share of the defence fell to the Mahratta Battalion—is a stirring story.
Contact was made with the enemy on 18th March in determined patrol clashes from which it soon became abundantly clear that the Japanese were advancing in much greater strength than at first had been supposed. At least an enemy Division, with supporting arms, was pressing forward along the Naga tracks leading west from Homalin. For several days the Brigade retired slowly, contesting the ground in determined rearguard battles in which the enemy took heavy punishment. ‘A’ Company, 4th Mahrattas, which had been detached in support of an isolated Paratroop Company, found itself assaulted by an entire enemy battalion, and in a stubbornly contested fighting retreat was extricated, bringing away all its wounded, from a dangerous situation by the Company Commander,
32 Major N. V. Holland, in praiseworthy fashion. For his gallantry and leadership on this occasion, as in earlier instances, Major Holland was awarded the M.C.
In clearing an enemy road block across the line of retreat of’ A ‘ Company, Jemadar Laxuman Desai thrice led his platoon in blitz assaults up the steep bank of a sunken road in face of very heavy machine-gun fire. Severely wounded in the third attack he lay in the middle of the road giving orders until be lost consciousness. For his outstanding example of courage and leadership Jemadar Desai gained a well-earned M.C. The M.C. was awarded also to Subedar Shripat Vishvasrao for his gallantry and leadership in securing the evacuation under fire of 25 badly wounded men.
By 22nd March the Brigade, in its fighting withdrawal, had reached the area of Sanshak where it had been decided to occupy a defensive position for a final stand on the plateau overlooking the Naga village of that name. The enemy pressing closely, and in order to gain time for the force to organize its defence, ‘D’ Company, 4th Mahrattas was ordered to occupy rising ground some little way in front of the main position. Gaining the crest of the rise ‘D’ Company found itself faced with a large enemy force already advancing up the reverse slope. Instantly appreciating the situation, the Company Commander, Major H. R. R. Steele, led his men in a fierce attack which drove the surprised Japanese back in disorder. Quickly reorganizing his company on the hill, Major Steele, who later was awarded the M.C., successfully held off much superior enemy forces for several vital hours until ordered to withdraw into the now prepared Brigade perimeter.
There followed for the isolated and surrounded Brigade four extremely trying days and nights when, subjected to constant heavy shelling and mortaring, without food and with very little water, it defended itself, and without hope of relief, desperately against successive attacks from greatly superior Japanese forces determined to remove this stubborn obstacle in their advance on Imphal. Attack was followed by counter-attack by day and by night and although part of the perimeter was overrun, that held by the Mahratta Battalion remained at all times firmly held despite the many casualties sustained. Reserve platoons or sections of Mahrattas were employed to help restore critical situations as these developed in other sectors of the ever contracting perimeter.
When part of the perimeter of a Parachute Battalion was overrun, leaving in an absolutely exposed position the two 3-inch mortars of the Mortar Detachment he was commanding, Havildar Sambhaji Bhuingde jumped from his emplacement and, ignoring the heavy fire coming down in the area, organized his mortar numbers in a position of all-round defence while setting an example by firing his rifle and hurling grenades to keep the enemy out of the post, thus saving his mortars and staving off a possible complete debacle. Although shot through the chest he continued, while lying on the ground and in great pain, to encourage the efforts of his men.
By the evening of 26th March additional forces having been concentrated for the defence of the Imphal area the survivors of the 50th Independent Brigade, who had been prepared—and indeed expected—to hold their position at Sanshak until finally destroyed, received an order to break out and fight their way back to Imphal, 40 miles distant. No alternative disposition being possible in the circumstances, the Brigade stood to at 2230 hours and moved out, maintaining its existing box formation, through the 4th Mahrattas’ sector of the perimeter. Strangely little opposition was met from the encircling Japanese who apparently were taken completely by surprise.
33 Daybreak found the Battalion broken up by the rough country and thick jungle into groups of varying strength, one of the largest of which accompanied Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Trim and Battalion H.Q., making their way cautiously and painfully to the westward with intermittent rifle and automatic fire indicating frequent clashes with strong Japanese parties moving to head them off. Exhausted after many days of hard fighting, without food and water other than the little obtained from friendly Nagas, encumbered by such wounded men as were able to walk, and suffering greatly from the extreme heat by day, the Battalion struggled onwards in small groups by various tracks across three 6,000 ft. mountain ranges towards our lines in the Imphal area which were reached by the Colonel’s party on the fourth day, other groups coming in for several days afterwards.
There being no alternative, the seriously wounded had to be left at Sanshak—a very hard decision to have to make—and it is believed that they received fair treatment from the Japanese. Many badly wounded men, however, made the effort to accompany the Battalion in its withdrawal and no praise can be too high for the resolution and endurance they displayed on that dreadful march to safety. Havildar Sainbhaji Bhuingde, shot right through the chest in defence of his mortars and later awarded the I.D.S. M., in reaching Imphal in four days displayed a notable example of fortitude.
On remustering, the 4th Battalion’s casualties in the Sanshak operations were found to be approximately 260 including three officers killed and wounded. Of the missing who fell into Japanese hands a large number escaped and later rejoined after making their way for many days by little known Naga tracks through the wild almost uninhabited mountains of that region. Several escapees, including the Regimental Armourer, turned up eventually at Dimapur having marched nearly 180 miles northwards to the Brahmaputra Valley.
The Army Commander has recorded the statement that the stand at Sanshak, in which the 4th Battalion played a notable part in delaying the advance ard splitting the Japanese column, gained the vital few days enabling the 5th and 7th Divisions to be flown in from the Arakan and so ensure the defence of Imphal. For his share in the defence, circumstances causing much of the responsibility for the organization and execution of the Brigade’s operations to devolve upon him, Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Trim later was awarded a well-merited O.B.E.
In the latter days of March strong Japanese forces passing through the bills to the east of Imphal, with the Assam railway at Manipur Road as their immediate objective, invested and attacked the small but vitally important centre of Kohima at an elevation of over 4,000 ft. on the Dimapur-Imphal Road included in the small garrison, consisting mostly of detachments from various units, which put up a notably gallant defence against fierce enemy attack for several days until strengthened by relieving troops, were two platoons of the 27th Mahrattas. This war service Garrison Battalion had been on active service in Assam since August 1943, engaged generally on airfield defence duties, ard the two platoons of Mahrattas, sharing in the defence of Kohima, worthily maintained the tradition of their regiment.
Following a short spell in reserve for reorganization and re-equipment both the 4th and 6th Battalions were moved up to occupy defence positions on the Litan Road covering the eastern approaches to Imphal. Both battalions held these positions, patrolling
34 vigorously and making occasional contact with small enemy forces endeavouring to infiltrate forward to the Imphal plain, until the middle of May when the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade was sent south to meet a new Japanese threat in the direction of Palel.
The 6th Battalion occupied defence positions in the area of Shuganu and during the period of 2lst/27th May had two companies engaged in support of elements of the 20th Indian Division in sharp actions to eliminate enemy forces which had succeeded in establishing themselves on the Tiddim Road and seriously threatened the 17th Indian Divisional Headquarters. For his skilful leadership of’ D’ Company in difficult circumstances, Major G. K. F. Reed later was awarded the M.C.
While its sister battalion was thus in action on the Tiddim Road the 4th Battalion became engaged in operations to counter a serious threat from the south where a strong force of Jifs, the Gandhi Brigade of the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army, was advancing through the very rough country immediately south-west of Palel. Marching on a man-pack scale, with a Mountain Battery in support, the Battalion, on 2nd June, made a long and very arduous march by Serai and Liwa with a climb of several thousand feet to the Naga village of Mitlong. After a short rest the Battalion moved out on a night approach march which involved a drop of 1,500 ft. to cross the Chapki Turel and a very steep climb of some 2,000 ft. on the farther side of the valley, and by first light was in position immediately below the enemy defences which patrols had accurately located on a series of steep crests. In the spirited attack which followed successive strong positions were taken with severe loss to the enemy, who generally put up stiff resistance before retiring in disorder to formidable prepared positions some distance in rear and from which, on the threat of a further Mahratta assault on the following day, they withdrew in haste towards their operational base at Mombi. Lack of water, and orders limiting the extent of operations, prevented further pursuit.
The Battalion’s losses in this its sole operation against the Jifs in force were not heavy but evacuation of wounded, such was the mountainous nature of the country, involved a two-day stretcher carry of 23 miles by Naga tracks. At least one badly wounded man died under the ordeal.
Less than two weeks after its return from Mitlong the 4th Battalion again experienced heavy fighting when it returned to the Litan Road sector to come temporarily under the command of the 20th Indian Division with the special task of ejecting the Japanese from a strong position on a high ridge overlooking the road and relieving an isolated platoon of a British regiment. Attacks on the position by units of the 20th Indian Division having failed, the task was allotted to the Mahratta Battalion with two troops of 7th Light Cavalry, mounted in Stuart tanks, in support.
The operation proved a sticky affair from the start. The monsoon had opened with very heavy rain and in the consequent slippery state of the ground it was found well-nigh impossible to get the tanks forward up the extremely steep slopes of the hill. Postponing the infantry assault, heavy bulldozers winched the tanks up an improvised track and at the end of two days, by which time the enemy were well aware of what was toward and all advantage of surprise was lost, three tanks—their clutches practically burnt out—had reached the crest of the ridge. With these three tanks giving such support of which they
35 were capable the attack went in on the morning of 15th June; the enemy having meanwhile reinforced their forward troops and strengthened their prepared positions.
Following a not very effective artillery concentration and air strike ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies, preceded by the three light tanks and with ‘ D’ Company in support, moved forward in pouring rain up the slope of the ridge. Almost immediately coming under heavy fire from all infantry weapons, and shelled by enemy artillery, the attack was pressed home despite heavy casualties, which included the two forward Company Commanders— Major N. V. Holland, M.C., and Captain J. R. Bessell—killed, and penetrated the Japanese forward defences with considerable loss to the enemy. Here, however, the assault was held up by murderous automatic and medium machine-gun fire at close range from well sited and strongly constructed enemy bunkers while numerous tree snipers and heavy mortar fire added to the stream of casualties passing to the rear.
Of the three tanks one had its tracks blown off on a mine while the second became hopelessly bogged on top of a caved in enemy bunker and the third had its turret jammed by a direct hit from an anti-tank gun which the Japanese had contrived to bring up and were shooting apparently over open sights. Nevertheless for several hours the infantry fought stubbornly on, edging forward in front and probing round the flanks with platoons of the reserve company, but everywhere were met and halted by the same murderous cross-fire from cleverly hidden defences in depth, while the tale of casualties steadily grew.
Lance-Naik Narayan Shinde took command and rallied his platoon after the Commander and all senior N.C.Os. were killed or wounded. Crawling forward to close quarters he led his men in a charge that overran six bunkered positions, killing the occupants, then held on until ordered to retire. For courage and leadership of a standard far beyond what might be expected from an N.C.O. of his rank this Lance-Naik was awarded the I.D.S.M.
Subedar Ramchandra Shinde, when his Company Commander and all Company H.Q. personnel were killed or wounded by an enemy shell, carried on the attack with no H.Q. and in face of very heavy small arms fire—in which he continually had to expose himself by standing up to give directions to his sub-units-—led three attempts to carry strong enemy positions and when ordered to retire extricated his company with skill and a display of cool leadership which earned for him a well-merited M.C.
After several hours of fruitless and costly effort, orders being received to discontinue the assault, the Battalion withdrew in the pitiless rain, bringing away all its wounded, to receive the commendation of the 4th Corps Commander, Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones, C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., who also expressed his sympathy in its heavy losses. In persistent efforts to come to grips with a determined and well sited enemy, and almost without support, some 130 of all ranks, including two well tried Company Commanders, were either killed or wounded. An officer of a Gurkha regiment, who observed the entire action, was heard to report on the telephone to his superiors that “These are the most gallant Indian troops I have seen in action.”
Reverting to the command of the 23rd Indian Division, the 4th Battalion, together with the 6th Battalion which meanwhile had been withdrawn from Shuganu, were imme
36 diately engaged in operations to meet a Japanese threat to Palel from the east. On 29th June two companies of the 6th Mahrattas, with a company of the 4th Battalion in support, attacked a commanding feature held by the enemy and overlooking the bridge at Palel. It was on this bridge that, on the previous night of teeming rain—and having only an hour or so previously completed a long and tiring march, a standing patrol of the 4th Mahrattas was suddenly and fiercely attacked out of the darkness by a body of Japanese armed only with swords, and only with difficulty succeeded in repelling their fanatical assailants.
The attack of the 6th Mahrattas was put in with boldness and resolution but despite the utmost gallantry of all ranks in attempting to work forward up the steep and slippery slopes in face of very heavy fire from machine-guns and grenade dischargers our troops eventually were compelled to withdraw without penetrating the Japanese defences, both leading Company Commanders having become casualties. An indication of the intensity of the enemy fire may be had from the fact that Major A. F. S. Wilson, who together with Subedar Tukaram Shewale was awarded the M.C. for gallantry in this action, in the space of a few minutes had the stock of his rifle shattered by an enemy bullet, his equipment and grenade pouch torn away by another, and was wounded in the hand by a third.
Three days later the same position was again attacked by the 6th Battalion—this time with adequate air, artillery, and tank support—and taken, the enemy not waiting to meet the assault.
Meanwhile the 4th Mahrattas, by a difficult night march up the Sengmai Turel on 28th/29th June, occupied without opposition or casualties except, unfortunately, from our own guns, a hill spur strategically situated relative to the surrounding Japanese positions. Subjected to sporadic attention from enemy artillery it was here, on 6th July, that an unlucky shell fell directly in the Battalion Command Post killing Lieut.-Colonel C. J. W. Simpson, who had succeeded to the command of the Battalion only six days before, and the Adjutant, Major W. D. McConnell.
At first light on the morning of the 8th July the Japanese position in Khunbi village was successfully attacked and taken. The company which put in the assault bad no easy task as in pouring rain and thick mist, which nullified both air and artillery support, as in face of very heavy automatic and grenade fire it scaled the extremely steep and slippery terraces of the burned out Naga village. Under cover of 2-inch mortars and grenade dischargers firing from a flank and gallantly led by Major P. S. Thapa and Subedar Sadhu Jagdale, both of whom were awarded the M.C. in recognition of their courage and leadership, the Mahrattas stormed over the crest and annihilated the defenders who, as customary with Japanese troops, defended their position to the last. For gallantry and initiative in destroying single-handed a troublesome enemy machine-gun post, Naik Laxuman Shinde was awarded the I.D.S.M.
As part of the same general operation in the Sengmai Turel the 6th Battalion was actively engaged during the period 3rd/l2th July in eliminating the Japanese from strongly held hill positions on Khudei Khunou ridge. In face of bold infiltration by fighting patrols and determined assaults upon successive elements of his somewhat extended position
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the enemy, who continually harassed the attackers by shell fire causing considerable casualties finally pulled out to the eastward. casualties, finally pulled out to the eastward. “sof persi~ At this period, the tide of Japanese invasion having halted and begun to ebb, the Army Commander decided to put into operation previously formulated plans for the general offensive to drive the now wavering enemy forces out of Manipur. For its part in the 23rd Indian Division’s share in the general plan—to drive the Japanese from their Tengnoupal positions and clear the road to Tamu—the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade was ordered to concentrate at Palel. Marching back to Palel in two days of heavy rain and and mud, after six weeks of constant marching and fighting in most difficult terrain and in the worst monsoon conditions, the two Mahratta battalions were given only 24 hours in which to reorganize and, as far as such was possible, to re-equip. Quite inadequate grace in view of the fact that all ranks were very tired, many ill with fever, and the great majority with broken feet and boots.
In accordance with the Divisional plan, which was for a surprise flanking march Tami by the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade to get well behind the Japanese positions and cut their supply line on the Tamu Road while the other two Brigades launched a frontal attack on the Tengnoupal defences, the two Mahratta Battalions marched on an expedition after the itself true Wingate pattern, on a man-pack basis carrying three days’ hard scale rations besides extra ammunition and grenades.
Weary and footsore, with mules only for a few mortars, signal and medical equip- no o ment, and a Mountain Battery, the long column plodded on—in single file with the Casu Brigadier in front toting his rifle and pack—for five long and weary days. Moving by as th narrow slippery Naga tracks, hidden from enemy observation in the eternal mist and rain and above the 5,000-6,000 ft. level, the going was very bad indeed on the endless succession morn of steep ridges. At times the vertical distance covered in a day’s march must have approximated to the map distance. Exhausted and fever-stricken men had to be left behind, to find their own way back or follow on as best they could, and fallen mules and equipment was retrieved from far down the khud-side while, in order to preserve security, no lighting of fires was permitted. After the first day, and for seven days thereafter, no hot food was cooked nor hot tea prepared—the lack of the last a very real hardship in such wet and miserable conditions. During these weary days and comfortless nights the column pressed back swiftly on to Sibong, a Naga village on a jungle-clad spur overlooking the Tamu Road in the Lokchau River gorge some 2,000 ft. below. The advance was so rapid that in spite of a small encounter between the Rajputana Rifles and an enemy post the Japs were taken completely by surprise. Undeterred by enemy harassing tactics initial efforts were made to approach and destroy the road bridge across the Lokchau River and this proving impracticable, owing to the precipitous nature of the to hi approach and strong enemy bunkered defences with dug-in tanks in support, operations developed into a fierce struggle for Battle Hill—a prominent feature, seizure of which would give close command of the road. For his cool courage and resource in a very valuable single-handed reconnaissance of the Lokchau area, when at great personal risk and although suffering from high fever he penetrated the Japanese position, Major H. S. Richmond of the 6th Battalion was awarded an extremely well merited M.C.
A previous assault by another unit having failed, on 25th July the 6th Mahrattas made a determined attack on Battle Hill. In the absence of artillery support, other than
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that of the Mountain Battery with the limited ammunition at its disposal, no preliminary softening up” was possible, and although the Mahrattas attacked with resolution and ersistence they were held up finally by the very heavy fire from enemy wired and bunkered positions effectively masked by long grass. After several hours’ fighting, and to avoid further wasteful casualties, the attacking companies were ordered to withdraw.
Battle Hill remaining untaken, the 4th Mahrattas moved out from Sibong before first light next day, 26th July, in an outflanking jungle march with the object of establishing and holding a road block a few miles north of Tamu. Carrying its rations and reserve ammunition on an all-porterage basis, and leaving its mortars behind, the Battalion moved slowly and painfully in a very steep descent, and subsequent climb, of some 2,000 through extremely rough country with no defined track to follow, and after five hours’ exhausting march reached the road at the prearranged point. So far the approach had been unopposed but, having dealt with a party of enemy marching in the direction of Tamu, the head of the column on crossing the road encountered enemy defences. Sharp fighting developed and before any attempt could be made to dig in, or any effective road Lock other than a line of tar barrels and a few mines be established, the Battalion found self violently counter-attacked by large numbers hurrying up from both directions.
Forced back from the road, the numerically weak battalion—Rifle Companies by this time were reduced to 40/50 men—took up an improvised defence position, with no opportunity to dig in, and defended itself throughout the remainder of the days. Casualties, which included Major W. M. Mackay temporarily in command, were numerous; the Battalion lay in its parlous situation harassed by enemy snipers, swept by automatic rid machine-gun fire, exposed to a rain of mortar and grenade discharger shells, and momentarily expecting to be rushed. Major H. R. R. Steele, M.C., and Subedar Ganpatrao Patil were outstanding examples of courage and devotion to duty as, exposed to the heaviest fire, they moved from group to group encouraging their men. Major Steele later ‘as awarded a bar to his M.C. while the M.C. also was given to Subedar Patil.
By nightfall, the enemy pressure having slackened, the Battalion disengaged on orders received, and withdrew. All through the darkness of the night the column struggled back through the jungle-filled ravines or on the steep khud-sides and next morning, exhausted and footsore but carrying its wounded, regained Sibong. For his courage under re and leadership in extricating his battalion from an extremely precarious situation, Major W. M. Mackay, M.C., was awarded the D.S.O.
Although the hoped-for road block had not been established, the imminent threat his rear so alarmed the enemy for the security of his escape route that his retirement, ore or less orderly hitherto, before the successful assault of the 23rd Indian Division quickly became a rout. Abandoning their Tengnoupal defences the Japanese fled in disorder through the hills with crippling loss of men and equipment in a debacle that carried ‘The Invaders of India’ back beyond the Chindwin River into Burma.
Aided by powerful support from Divisional Artillery, now brought within effective range, the 6th Mahrattas occupied Battle Hill on 31st July with little opposition and established contact with the main forces of the Division advancing from Tengnoupal. Thereafter the much tried Brigade, of which barely half the number which had started
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thence sixteen days before remained on their feet, marched for two days wearily up the road to Palel. The two Mahratta Battalions arrived on 3rd August—worn out, ragged, bearded, and unbelievably dirty—to be sent rearwards to Shillong for an extended period of rest and rehabilitation. Their first and only spell out of the forward area in almost two and a half years.
En route to Shillong the column fell in with the 27th Battalion, at Mao on the Imphal-Dimapur Road, and with the 18th Battalion, a war service battalion which following a period of famine duty in Bengal during 1943, was then engaged in railway defence with its headquarters at Gauhati.
Throughout the monsoon period of 1944 activity in the Arakan sector, where the rainfall is particularly heavy and continuous, was necessarily restricted, but towards the end of the year our forces in this area, taking advantage of improved conditions, proceeded to exert pressure on the enemy defences. Shaken and materially weakened by their recent heavy defeats, both in the Arakan and in Manipur, the Japanese began to pull out from their forward positions in the Buthedaung area. Following up this methodical withdrawal the 17th Battalion, which had been on active service in this sector since the beginning of the year, continued in close contact with enemy rearguards throughout the advance down the Mayu Peninsula, sustaining some casualties from the shelling with which the Japanese sought to delay the pursuit, and early in 1945 entered the port of Akyab.
Embarking from Akyab on 2nd February in river steamers the Battalion proceeded to reinforce our amphibious troops in their operations to occupy the Myebon Peninsula further south. Re-embarking at Myebon in landing craft, the 17th Mahrattas made an assault landing near the village of Ruywa. Opposition on the beaches was limited to hostile shelling, but on pushing inland contact was made with enemy infantry, severe fighting developing as for several days and nights the Japanese made repeated counterattacks upon the hastily prepared Mahratta defences. These positions covered the enemy’s supply road and denied its use by their wheeled transport, some vehicles being destroyed by fire.
That portion of the block held by ‘A’ Company was particularly the object of determined enemy shelling, many casualties being sustained, and of fierce infantry attacks, all of which were successfully beaten off although, on one occasion, not before several Japanese, led by an officer, were killed inside the Mahratta perimeter. Sepoy Krishna Rathore, in the darkness and confusion, succeeded in hitting the enemy captain on the head with a shovel and, seizing the sword from his grasp, killed the officer with his own weapon. The sepoy later was presented officially with the sword to keep as a souvenir of his exploit.
In April 1945 the 17th Battalion embarked at Akyab for Madras and on the sudden capitulation of Japan in August, together with the 4th and 6th Battalions which also had been brought back to India for special training, was on the point of sailing with the newly formed 34th Corps of the Twelfth Army to participate in amphibious operations for the recapture of Singapore.
40 Early in September the operation was carried out as planned, the three Mahratta Battalions landing unopposed at ports on the west coast of Malaya to take the surrender, at Kuala Lumpur, of the Japanese forces in that area and to maintain order in the liberated colony.
Thus the Second Great War officially ended, but for the 4th and 6th Battalions more work was still to be done.
On the outbreak of trouble in Java, they moved as part of the 49th Brigade to Batavia. Here they became involved in a sudden armed uprising of the civil population, which trapped them in isolated groups, some of these were unable to withstand the unexpected weight of the assaults made on them and were overwhelmed before the situation could be got in hand. Casualties were high and among them five officers were lost, while Captain R. C. Smith of the 4th and Captain T. L. Laughiand of the 6th, who were with Brigadier Mallaby, when he was murdered, escaped after enduring considerable danger and hardship.
The complete story of their heroic exploits is still to be told, for both battalions are still in the Dutch East Indies—” Carry on.”
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