CHAPTER III

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THE REGIMENT IN THE WAR OF l939-45

Africa and the Middle East

THE outbreak of the recent World War in September 1939 found four out of the five active battalions of the 5th Mahratta light Infantry employed in garrison duties in various parts of India and on the restless North-West Frontier. Only the 2nd Battalion was then beyond India’s borders, having proceeded overseas in August 1939 as part of the garrison of the Aden Protectorate.

With the declaration of war upon Hitlerite Germany all reservists, both officers and other ranks, were immediately recalled to service with the Colours and all battalions brought up to war strength in anticipation of the stern work all knew must lie ahead.

Nevertheless, Europe and Germany were far distant from India where the tempo of war at first beat slowly and it was not until after the entry of Mussolini’s Italian Empire into the war, following the fall of France in June 1940, that field service for the Indian Army became an imminent actuality. Indian troops proceeded overseas to help protect Egypt against the certainty of Italian invasion and, following the occupation of British Somaliland by a strong Italian force, to strengthen the thin defences of the Sudan menaced by powerful enemy forces from behind the borders of Eritrea and Abyssinia.

It was to take part in the defence of the Sudan and in the subsequent successful operations that led to the elimination of Mussolini’s East African Empire that battalions of the Mahratta Light Infantry first proceeded on field service in this greatest of all wars.

It has been mentioned that the 2nd Battalion was already serving overseas, in Aden, and in August 1940 this Battalion disembarked at Port Sudan to be followed a few days later by the 3rd Battalion come direct from India. Both battalions proceeded to the Khartoum area and early in 1941, as units respectively of the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, took a notable share in the arduous and brilliant campaign to remove the threat to the Sudan and seize the enemy colony of Eritrea. Both these battalions won undying fame in the desperate and bloody assault which took the Italians’ immensely strong mountain fortress of Keren in March 1941.

The campaign opened with intensive patrolling and a series of engagements with Italian forces threatening the Sudan which resulted in the capture in succession of the fortified towns of Gallabat, Kassala, Urn Hagar, and Tessenei and the driving of the enemy back across his own frontiers into Eritrea. For his gallantry and example while leading a boldly planned and executed night raid on Fort Gallabat Captain P. C. Doyle of the 3rd Battalion was awarded the M.C., and the I.O.M. was posthumously awarded to Naik Vishnu Mane who was mortally wounded while gallantly leading his section against an enemy machine-gun post.

By the end of February the British forces had reached the area of Keren and on 15th March the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions launched a frontal attack upon that powerful

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and strongly held mountain fortress. The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieut-Colonel A. 0. Kersey, M.C., was set the task of assaulting and capturing the precipitous and rocky feature known as Flat Top. The attack was launched according to plan and ‘D’ Company on the right, under heavy mortar fire and having lost its Company Commander severely wounded when scarcely over the starting line, under Subedar Narayan Palao quickly seized its immediate objective.

‘C’ Company on the left also made rapid progress until, some 200 ft. below its objective, it was held up by heavy mortar fire. Nevertheless the company continued to work its way forward and the bodies of the Company Commander, Captain N. Church, and five men later were found actually on the summit.

The two reserve companies were then ordered forward in support and after severe bomb fighting the Mahrattas, by sheer gallantry, drove the enemy, who all the time were in superior strength, from their well-nigh impregnable positions on the summit. For his gallantry and fine leadership in this attack Major Cocksedge was awarded the D.S.O.

During the night powerful enemy counter-attacks succeeded in recapturing the summit of Flat Top. The sole remaining reserve, one platoon, having failed to restore the situation, the Adjutant, Captain A. J. Oldham, collected thirty men of the porterage company and organized a second counter-attack. This assault he led personally in a bayonet charge and successfully dislodging some 150 of the enemy, reoccupied Flat Top. For his initiative and gallantry in this desperate action Captain Oldham was awarded the M.C.

The Battalion thus, in a day and night of desperate fighting with a resolute enemy superior in numbers and having every advantage of position, succeeded in carrying and holding its objectives. Some measure of the severity of the action, however, may be reckoned from the casualties suffered in the attack and subsequent consolidation, these being, killed and wounded, 3 British officers, JO Indian officers, and 245 other ranks.

At the same time that its sister battalion was making this desperate bid for Flat Top, and as part of the same general assault on the Keren defences, the 3rd Battalion, some way to the right and under command of Lieut.-Colonel Reid, D.S.0., M.C., was engaged in a task at least equally difficult. As part of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade the Battalion’s immediate objectives were the two steep and strongly held features known as Pimple and Pinnacle. It was not until late afternoon that the Battalion was ordered into the attack and, passing through our advanced troops which were holding the lower slopes of the two hills, the leading companies began to scale the precipitous slopes. They were met by heavy and accurate fire from machine-guns and mortars and, finding direct assault on the precipitous slopes impossible, made for the saddle between the two features. As darkness fell very heavy mortar and machine-gun fire could be heard as the two companies pressed forward undeterred by heavy casualties. Twice ‘B’ Company, commanded by Subedar Shrirang Lawand, were forced back and yet a third time, en­couraged by the example of their indomitable leader, they pressed forward until the saddle was reached. Fifteen minutes later they were on their objective. The Divisional Commander has placed on record how, in the darkness, the first intimation he had of the capture of Pinnacle was hearing, from across the valley, the triumphant Mahratta battle-cry of” Shivaji Maharaj ki jai.”

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Pimple was carried during the night and, assaulting on the heels of a defeated counter-attacking force, the West Yorkshires took the key position of Fort Dologorodoc.

There followed some days of consolidation and reconnaissance, always under heavy mortar and artillery fire from which severe casualties were sustained, and on 25th March the Brigade again went into the attack with the object of securing sufficient ground for the Sappers to repair the extensive demolition on the Keren road and so enable the tanks and armoured cars to go through. There followed two days of heavy fighting in most difficult country, fighting in which the enemy held every advantage of position and inflicted grievous casualties, but in spite of losses the Battalion pressed steadily on until eventually news was received that the Sappers’ task was done and the demolition repaired. Next morning a dirty strip of white cloth fluttered from the enemy-held Sanchal Peak —the battle for Keren was over. An enemy superior in strength had been driven out of well-nigh impregnable positions and the Mahrattas had played a notable part in this great victory which effectually broke Italian power in East Africa. But the price had been heavy. In twelve days of continuous fighting the Battalion suffered in casualties, which included the Commanding Officer wounded, 7 British officers, 7 Indian officers, and 238 other ranks.

In recognition of his leadership throughout the battle and the inspiring example of his personal gallantry, Lieut.-Colonel Reid was awarded a bar to his D.S.O. while the M.C. was fittingly awarded to Subedar Shrirang Lawand, who, by his outstanding leader­ship under heavy fire and complete disregard of personal danger, in command of one of the assaulting companies was very largely responsible for the capture of Pinnacle Hill and its retention in the face of very heavy enemy shell fire and repeated counter-attack. For his gallantry and devotion to duty in command of another company during the assault, in which he was severely wounded, the M.C. was also awarded to Captain d’Issa Boomgardt.

            For their personal initiative and conspicuous gallantry in evicting the enemy from his strong position on these bullet-swept and well-nigh inaccessible slopes a number of N.C.Os. and sepoys of both battalions were cited in despatches and later awarded the I.O.M. or the 1.D.S.M. It may fairly be claimed for the two battalions that, since they alone of all the battalions engaged succeeded in taking their objectives and holding them against all counter-attacks, their gallant conduct was mainly responsible for the signal victory of Keren. The following may be quoted from a message received by Lieut.-Colonel Kersey, commanding the 2nd Battalion, from Brigadier R. A. Savory in command of 11th Indian infantry Brigade    

            “I wish in particular to thank your Battalion for the great dash it displayed in

capturing and holding Flat Top Hill, in spite of very severe casualties. It has been a magnificent effort. Will you please tell your officers and men that 1 am now more proud than ever to have them in my Brigade.”

At the same time that their sister battalions were making regimental history in East Africa, the 1st Battalion and 5th Royal Battalion were ordered to mobilize and shortly afterwards, in May and July respectively, sailed from India to disembark for field service, as had their fathers of the old 103rd and 117th only a generation earlier, at the port of Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf.

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For some years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe Nazi influence had insidiously penetrated throughout the Moslem lands of the Middle East and in the early months of the war the activities of enemy agents in spreading pro-Axis propaganda in this region were greatly intensified. The unbroken series of German military successes in Western Europe in 1940 and in the Balkans during the spring of 1941 followed by the apparently irresistible advance of Hitler’s armies into Soviet Russia in the summer of the latter year encouraged strong pro-Nazi elements, led by the would-be Dictator Rashid Au in Iraq and Riza Shah the tyrant ruler of Iran, openly to declare in active collaboration with the apparently all-conquering European Dictators.

In order to protect British interests in these two countries, and particularly to secure the vitally important oil-fields, it became urgently necessary for Britain to effect the military occupation of both Iraq and Iran. In the late summer of 1941 the 1st Battalion operated with the force that occupied Baghdad and secured the vital oil pipe-line running westwards to the Palestinian coast while the Royal Battalion performed excellently in the short but sharp fighting which preceded the capture of Kurramshahr (Mahomerrah) and the collapse of Iranian resistance. Thus were the Iranian oil-fields secured and enemy activities, both in that country and in Iraq, successfully forestalled.

During the ensuing two years these two battalions served—with an exciting interlude in the case of the 1st Battalion, which was hurried to the Western Desert for a few tense weeks to assist in holding back Rommel’s imminent threat to Egypt in 1942—in garrison and security duties in Iraq and Northern Iran, the Royal Battalion co-operating on occa­sions with Soviet Russian troops which had entered the latter country from the direction of the Caucasus. During this long period of testing service, frequently in most trying extremes of climate from the burning sands of Iraq to the snow-covered mountains of Northern Iran, and generally lacking the stimulus of active service, both battalions earned unqualified praise for their steadiness, good discipline, and soldierly qualities in all circumstances.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the end of the East African Campaign, the success of which they had so signally helped to ensure in the victorious battle of Keren, both the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions were embarked in the summer of 1941 for Egypt, whence the former proceeded as part of the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade of the famous 4th Indian Division for service in the Western Desert and the latter, after a long march into Iran and back to Palestine, was embarked for Cyprus where during the winter of 1941-42 it remained with the 5th Indian Division in the role of defence of that important island against possible imminent enemy air and sea attack.

Frequently in contact with the enemy in the coastal sector of the Western Desert front, with patrolling and the organization of defence positions as its general role, the 2nd Battalion participated in the abortive assault on the enemy’s strong Halfaya positions in June 1941 and the more successful attack upon Bir-el-Gobi in December of the same year. In both these operations the Battalion attacked with great gallantry in the face of powerful and determined enemy opposition and suffered severe casualties from machine-gun and mortar fire.

For their gallantry during the earlier engagement at Halfaya in June, when the 2nd Battalion lost in casualties 7 officers (British and Indian) and 108 other ranks, two

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Indian officers were awarded the LO.M. On 15^th/17^th June Subedar-Major Raojirao Shinde having been left in command of ‘D’ Company during the withdrawal, it was entirely due to his coolness and disregard of personal danger that he was able to extricate the company, with the minimum loss of life and equipment, from a difficult situation exposed to accurate machine-gun fire. During the action and long approach march he displayed such energy and endurance as would have been remarkable in a much younger man.

On the morning of 16th June Jemadar Sakharam Shinde led his platoon under very heavy artillery and close and accurate machine-gun fire. He personally led the forward section which captured the objective, and in so doing was badly wounded. Nevertheless, he saw to the advance of his other two sections and remained in command during the rest of the day. Later Jemadar Sakharam Shinde, who displayed courage and determination of the highest order, died of his wound.

The 2nd Battalion was again heavily engaged in the action at Bir-el-Gobi on 4th/6th December 1941, when during a powerful enemy counter-attack two companies were overrun by a concentration of German tanks, losing in casualties 3 British officers, 5 Indian officers, and 240 other ranks.

Notable devotion to duty, for which he deservedly won the posthumous award of the l.O.M., was displayed by Sepoy Babaji Desai who, when his Section Commander had been killed, took command and used his Bren gun very effectively in assisting the advance of the company against heavy enemy machine-gun fire. Later this sepoy was ordered to remain in position covering the withdrawal of his company and carried out this task so well that the company suffered few casualties from the fire of the enemy’s machine-guns on its immediate front. Sepoy Babaji Desai and the two men with him were killed before they could themselves withdraw.

In February 1942 a noteworthy and very successful raid was carried out by a patrol of the 2nd Battalion upon the airfield of Martuba, then some 40 miles in rear of the enemy’s lines. The party, consisting of Captain A. J. Oldham, M.C., Lieutenant J. B. Elliott, and eight other ranks with two Mahratta sappers, proceeded some distance in trucks which they later concealed and continued on foot making use of the cover afforded by the many deep wadis common to this area of the Western Desert. On the second night out the party were able to approach and reconnoitre the airfield and on the following night made a daring and successful raid resulting in the destruction, with demolition charges, of three enemy aircraft and a bomb dump.

Successfully evading interception by the surprised enemy the party was able to withdraw into the desert, and on the fourth day regained the British lines. For his leader­ship and judgment in this daring raid Captain Oldham was awarded a bar to his M.C.

In recognition of his able handling of his battalion in successive rearguard actions covering the retreat of the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade in the general retiral of the army from the Barce-Benghazi area during the period 24th January to 4th February 1942, Lieut.-Colonel M. P. Lancaster, commanding the 2nd Battalion, was awarded the D.S.O.

June 1942 saw Rommel’s powerful and successful counter-offensive which carried his Afrika Korps to El Alamein and the very gates of Egypt. As the British Desert Army

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fell back to the eastward the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached to the South African Division hastily thrown into Tobruk to hold that fortress on the enemy’s sea flank. On 20th June, at daybreak, the enemy launched a very powerful surprise attack with his armoured forces on that sector of the perimeter held by the Mahrattas. Assisted by intense dive-bombing from the air the heavy enemy armour broke into and over­whelmed the thinly held defences, and within a very short time the tragedy of Tobruk was complete. A splendid Brigade of the incomparable 4th Indian Division had ceased to exist. With the marching away into captivity of its survivors there passes out of our story, but not, be it assured, out of honoured memory, the gallant 2nd Battalion.

The high regard in which the 2nd Battalion, as part of the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, was held is evident in the following letter written by Major-General F. I. S. Tuker, commanding the 4th Indian Division, a few weeks after the fall of Tobruk, to the Commandant of the Regimental Centre at Belgaum :—

“Dear Commandant,

I have wished to write to you before but have not done so as I had hoped to get more news of your 2nd Battalion. I have had no more. All I can tell you is that the attack opened on 2/5th Mahratta front on the morning of 20th June, at 0630 hours, with smoke, H.E., and air bombing. German infantry lifted the perimeter mine­field and got into the defences. But this was no real matter. 11th Brigade asked for the prearranged tank counter-attack by Division to go in at once. It never materialised and the opportunity passed. Finally the Brigade Commander put in all his reserve Carriers and they were wiped out. Then followed a German tank attack with up to 70 tanks, as far as can be made out, mainly on the 2/5th front. 2/5th put up their usual courageous fight but were swamped from all accounts.

We have no news of any of your officers or men.

Tobruk was under command of Major-General Klopper, South African Division, and the bulk of the troops were South Africans. 11th Brigade held a front of about 12 miles on the E. and S.E. face of Tobruk—right, Camerons; centre, 2/Sth M.L.I.; left, 2/7th G.R. The Brigade at the time was detached from 4th Indian Division.

11th Brigade Group fought as it always has done—the 2/7th G.R. were still fighting on 12 hours after Tobruk had surrendered; Camerons repulsed three attacks before being overrun by tanks; 2/5th did all that was humanly possible and more; 25th Field Regiment fought till 14 out of 16 guns were destroyed and then blew up the other two. One Troop left 8 destroyed German tanks in front of it.

The loss of 11th Brigade is to us quite irreparable. We regarded them as the finest Infantry Brigade in the Army. In this Brigade your 2nd Battalion has always played a most gallant part, and has added a long chapter of courage, skill, and devotion to the history of your famous regiment.

The reason for the loss of Tobruk was that the place was hastily occupied, insufficiently mined, 11th Brigade had far too big a front (12 miles), and A/T guns were very few, while the arrangements for the Division counter-attack were obviously faulty. This last may have been the main reason for the failure.

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Please let the Colonel of your regiment know the little I have been able to tell you here.”

To meet the threat to the Nile Valley of Rommel’s seemingly irresistible advance reinforcements were hurriedly rushed to the Western Desert approaches and with these came the 1st Battalion the Mahratta Light Infantry from Iraq and the 3rd Battalion from Cyprus. The stay of both these battalions in Egypt was short but both nobly played their part in the confused and critical ten days before the line was established to bait Rommel’s advance at El Alamein. Hastily thrown forward into defence positions the abandonment of which, in order to avoid encirclement, was almost immediately ordered, the two batta­lions became involved in the hurried retreat from Mersah Matruh.

Already mobile forces were across their line of retreat and in the confusion of the subsequent break through to the eastward, considerable losses were sustained. These included Lieut.-Colonel Marshall, commanding the 1st Battalion, and Brigadier Reid, D.S.O., M.C., who had been until recently in command of the 3rd Battalion, both being taken prisoner along with other officers and men, and Major Hale, Second-in-Command of the 1st Battalion, who was killed in action.

With the reorganization of the Eighth Army, on the timely arrival of reinforce­ments from Britain, those forces so hurriedly assembled to meet the recent emergency were redispersed and in this redistribution the 1st and 3rd Battalions returned respectively to their erstwhile duties in Iraq and Cyprus.

By the middle of 1943. the Axis threat to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East had receded with the destruction in Tunisia of Field-Marshal Rommel’s Afrika Korps at the hands of the British, Indian, and Dominions troops of General Montgomery’s Eighth Army, and the three remaining Mahratta units—the 1st Battalion, 3rd Battalion, and 5th Royal Battalion, which last recently had been converted to the specialised role of a Machine Gun Battalion—together with other elements of the 8th and 10th Indian Divisions, were brought to Syria and the Suez Canal area for specialised training in Mountain Warfare and Amphibious Operations in readiness for the campaign then being prepared to carry the war into Axis-held Southern Europe.

With the departure of the three regular battalions of the 4th Mahratta Anti-Tank Regiment (originally the 8th Battalion), which accompanied them to Italy, and of the 5th Mahratta Anti-Tank Regiment (originally the 9th Battalion) to India—the Artillery units having served since 1942 in Iraq and Syria—no Mahratta formations remained with the forces of the Middle East until, in the very last weeks of the war, the 14th Battalion, a war service battalion which had earlier proceeded overseas for a period in 1942-43 to garrison the tiny Attu Atoll in the Indian Ocean against possible Japanese attack, arrived from India for service in Iraq.

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