The Attack by the 2nd Battalion, The Durham Light Infantry at Donbaik Near Foul Point, Arakan, Burma, 18 March 1943

The Battalion was part of an Independent Brigade that had been formed from the Battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division who had trained in Amphibious Warfare, and were given the task of invading and taking the Island of Akyab, located south of the Arakan Peninsula. The amphibious Naval craft that were assembled for our use were loaded on lorries specially made for their transportation and taken away. It would appear the higher commands had been arguing as to who had priority over these Naval vessels, whatever the outcome we lost them. Other modes of boats were tried but were useless in these strong tidal waters where we had to attack; the amphibious effort was called off. 

Back we went to the tents until it was decided to put us in by land to drive the Japanese from the Mayu Peninsular on which they had obtained a foothold from a place called Foul Point. Weak Indian Army defensives were driven back, we were ordered to go and drive the Japs back, it was decided that we would do night marches to the area of Donbaik. Setting off laden with our war-like stores, marching over these very primitive roads and tracks through the jungle was hard going. Quickly taking over from the Indian Battalions: other Coys: moved into the front line whilst we were held in reserve at the waterhole where our Q Branch had established themselves, being given direct instructions not to fire unless you saw the whites of enemies’ eyes; we dug in. It was a well known fact that the Indian units maybe a bit jittery, fired thousands of rounds during the hours of darkness, we being ordered not to fire brought the Jap patrols out to find out what was happening, they even probed as far as the waterhole, coming from the crest of the Mayu Ridge. Later we were moved forward and took over from a Company of Royal Welsh Fusiliers who were ordered to attack the Jap positions known as Sugar 4 & 5, which had been established as strong Jap bunkers who could fire on each other giving protective fire. During this change over, I was introduced to Jack Hawkins, the actor, who was a Captain in the RWF, and second in Command. He took no part in this attack because he, like our own 2i/c had to return to their HQs where they were held in reserve in case their Coy Commanders were knocked out. Sadly, this attack by the Welshmen failed. The CSM was killed on one of these bunkers whilst throwing grenades at the bunkers. 

My Company was then ordered to prepare to attack these same positions supposedly at first light on the 17^th March (St. Patrick’s Day), prior to this move by my Coy. the Battalion Battle Patrol, under the leadership of Lt Martin Wilson, was ordered to ambush a party of Japs who were seen by observation posts to leave Foul Point at regular times of an evening carrying supplies to their forward positions. The Battle Patrol, armed with American Thompson Machine Guns and grenades, crossed the Chaung (low tidal waters leading from high ground to the sea) in front of our own positions and made their way to near Foul Point unobserved. Setting up their ambush site, which was timed to be sprung at a certain time, I was on duty, at that time sharing the night two on two off with the Coy Cmdr. I listened for the sound of their gun fire, but could only hear the thump of grenade explosions. After the ambush they broke off in pairs, making their way back through our defensive positions. Their Tommy Guns had blown up, the breech area of their guns had blown out, they had to use grenades to complete the ambush. They said “ if they met up with any Japs we had nothing left to fight them with, so we would have had it”. My Tommy Gun had done exactly the same thing when my Company Commander, Major W Hutton, whilst at Juhu Beach in India said “Come on Sergeant Major, I want to test your gun”. Finding a quiet part of the beach Major Hutton raised the gun and fired out to sea. I did not like the sound of the explosion and said “Major let me check that gun I do not like the sound of the explosion” to which he replied “You are being too cautious Sergeant Major” and raising the gun to his shoulder he fired, then both he and the gun fell to the sand and he was out cold. As I scanned him for wounds others came running up to see what had happened. Major Hutton began to recover and some Officers helped him away to the Ml Room. Picking the gun out of the sand I saw that the end of the gun had peeled back due to the explosion, Major Hutton must have been overcome by the force of the blast. Our Battalion Armourer Sergeant took the Tommy Gun away, he had to cut out the barrel in pieces to get to the fault; two rounds were jammed together, the first round had not left the gun. NO COURT OF ENQUIRY WAS ORDERED, which if one had of been ordered may have saved any further faults pith the gun. When we received these guns, about six to each Company, no instructional handbooks were issued with them to know how to dismantle and assemble them for normal cleaning and oiling etc. By trial and error we found that, if we pushed a nail through a hole in the gun when the working parts were to the rear, we could then take a good part of the gun to pieces for normal cleaning. Maybe we were doing it all wrong, there was no other option of taking it to bits to clean. Due to this foul up of the guns the CO sought and obtained permission for my Company to be relieved and taken out of the front so as to carry out a complete ammunition change. It was thought that dampness had seeped into the ammo due to us doing so much training at sea and on lakes for our amphibious role.

The company was relieved by a Coy of The Lincolnshire Regiment from an Indian Brigade, so that we could move out to the waterhole to complete this ammo change. My Coy spent 24 hours doing this job. It was my job to collect and issue ammo to the Platoons, which we did. On opening the boxes of 303 I remarked to both the RSM and QM that I did not like the colour of the brass cartridges of the new ammo. It was a light yellow unlike ours which was a bronze colour. Prior to joining the Army I had been an Engineer, well trained in metals. This brass was the cheapest and softest of them all, it was, as we called it, Magnamese Brass. However, on closer inspection, it was noted that all of these boxes of 303 came from KIRKEE ARSENAL, India, they also bore the inspectors signature as serviceable ammunition.

Having completed our change over we marched out in Jungle style to rejoin our old positions, in order that the attack could go ahead on the following day, the 18th March 1943.

On the move before first light we moved into a dried up Nalla bed (Nallas to which I refer are cuts in the soft earth caused by monsoon waters pouring down from the Mayu Range to reach the sea, forcing their way to the sea by gouging out the earth with great force making small stream beds). We formed up for the attack in a dried Nalla with Coy HQ commanded by Major Bill Hutton, to the right of us in line was 14 Pin commanded by Lt Francis Greenwell and on our left was 11 PIn commanded by Lt James Freeman. It was to be a two Platoon and HQ Coy attack. Our other Platoon, 9 Pin commanded by Lt Dinga Bell had to do an independent task on a place known as the Elbow. Our artillery was by now pounding the area in front of us, the smoke and dust enshrouding us. We had a few minutes to go before 5.30 am, the Company Commander gave the order “Smoke if you wish”. The officers and men dragged out their pipes and fags lighting up as if their lives depended on that one smoke. They hung onto their smokes enjoying them in those tense moments, and what was for many of them their last ones. It is the only time that I wished that I smoked, just for what appeared to be the joy of it.

The plan was to go over the top at 5.30 am into a second Nalla about twenty yards away then into a third and deeper one before going over it and attacking Sugar 4 & 5. The sea could be seen to the right which was clear and blue. The area to Sugar 5 was devoid of jungle, it was, however, criss-crossed with Nallas and many Jap positions were studded around this area. The jungle commenced just past 4 & 5 rising steeply to the forward slopes of the Mayu Range of hills, the Japs having gun positions etc, studded around this hill. Some enemy posts had been located, but not all. Prior to these attacks it was decided by higher

command to bomb this hill with Indian Vulti Vengeance bombers. To this we all had to vacate our Company positions after the bombing to race back again in case the Japs took them over. It would appear after all that work and planning that it was not a great success, so another plan was devised which was to bring aircraft in to drop inflammables on this feature then set it on fire with artillery flares. Some of the hill burned very feebly, it was then decided to attack as we were about to do with the Infantry.

Time to go, 5.3Oam. As we swarmed over the top onto the flat before the drop into the second Nalla we were excited and full of little prayers. (I know you laugh, but I wonder how many did say a prayer, as I did). On our way to the third NalIa my Company Commander came over and said “Hold Coy HO in that second Nalla for the time being so I know where to locate you”. We back­tracked and settled into an all round position and waited. A few minutes elapsed when the wireless set came alive. It was the CO, Lt Col Theobald, requiring information and asking for the “Queen Bee” (Coy Cdrs Kittab). He was not with us, which I informed the CO “Find him” he said, “What is happening?” “Sir,” I replied, “I have been in an attack before, this one is most peculiar. I do not hear any sound of our Brens or rifle fire whereas it should be going at full blast at this moment.” “Get the Company Commander.” I responded by running off on my own, (we were always sup­posed to take an escort) in the direction that I last saw the Company Comman­der. I had seen his batman stretchered off with little hope for him, so I had to find Major Hutton.

The Platoons should have climbed over the third Nalla, but for some reason had branched off left and right along the bed of the Nalla. Making off in that direction I found my Company Commander on his own, badly wounded in the knee. I dragged and carried him to our start point handing him over to our A Company. There the Company Commander of A Company gave me a stiff drink of Rum. (Query: Why had we, who were doing the attack, not received a Rum ration?)

I rejoined my Company HQ and, getting the CO on the set, I told him about the Queen Bee being out of it. He shouted through the speaker, “Sergeant Major, get the Company moving.” Running then into the Nalla in front I ran along to the right, the direction that the Senior Lt Greenwell must have taken. I found him on a stretcher with many bits of shrapnel in him. I went to where some of the men lay, “Come On,” I said “we are going in”, which was my intention. Looking towards Sugar 4 & 5, there was a pile of 10 Platoon motionless in death.

Waving to the men to come around for a charge, I told them that they would take their orders from me and we were going in, then a Corporal called Patterson said, “Sir, the Brens won’t fire, nor the rifles.” I was truly astounded at this remark. In my eleven years of soldiering the only time I had known a Bren not to fire it had been cured quickly by IA (immediate action). Pushing my way behind a Bren gun which was already loaded, I pressed the trigger. The round that came from the gun seemed to trickle out of the barrel.

Applying IA, I tried to pull the cocking handle back to change the mag. Surprisingly it would not come back. Seizing a firm hold on the cocking handle and using force, it came back only slightly. Putting the butt on the ground, I had to use force to get the handle fully back. Changing the magazine, I fired again with the same result. Going through the same routine to get the cocking piece back, I took off the mag and changed the gas port to give more gas onto the working portions of the gun, but to no avail. I examined the rounds discharged and found them misshapen. (How I wished afterwards that I had kept some of those rounds.) Then I tried to fire a rifle. It was a hard job just to raise the bolt head without all of the effort to get it back. The Corporal was right, we were in dire difficulties. I asked him where Sgt Scott was and he pointed out front, “There,” he said “dead, and LJSgt Stevenson.”

Leaving the NCO and the men there, I told them to take up an all round position until I returned, I was then told that, due to the failure of the weapons all together, it was decided to go in with grenades. Lt Greenwell., the Sergeants and a few more men collected all the grenades from the rest of the Platoon, in fact then sent over to 9 Platoon for some of their grenades.

When all was ready they went in and long before they were anywhere near Sugar 4 & 5 they were gunned down, fire coming from all over, mainly from the slopes of the Mayu Hill. It was a complete fire trap, the Lieutenant seemed to be the only one left alive of those that went in.

Running once more again to find Lt Freeman, to do this I had to run past our D Coy, into the third Nalla of ours and down a gradual slope. My heart turned when I saw all of those brave lads in a sickening sight, dead and wounded. I never saw the Platoon Commander, but I was told he was wounded. Right opposite where I entered the Nalla with its very steep walls there was a re-entrant which was filled chocka­block with tightly packed thorn bushes, the only way to shift that would be a lengthy job burning it off. This would have allowed us access to Sugar 4 & 5. From piecing the story together, from what I heard later, it would seem that what happened was that the Japanese in their cunning way had made the Nalla wall straight, removing all likely hand or foot holds, and in fact making it deeper in places (this is what the lads were saying).

This was the reason why the Platoons had branched right and left, the bank was unsurmountable without aids of sorts such a s scaling ladders, or bridging across the Nalla. Once in this deep cleft in the ground, grenades had been showered on them from above. The foxholes that were noticed by Capt Kelly whilst on patrol and reported as not now in use, were in fact used by the Japs when attacks came in, from these positions they just rolled grenades in on the lads. Judging by the number of Indian bodies, now decomposing, they had received the same treatment, now our newly dead were joining them in death. Standing in the Nalla, I realised that this attack was finished. Patrols out on previous occasions had never reported the height of the Nalla wall, if they had the powers above must have known that, without scaling ladders or some sort of ramp, this attack was not a feasible project. Seeing all the dead and wounded lying there, it is a sight I will never forget and still at the age of 83 I have nightmares about this scene.

Calling on the men to get the wounded out, I distinctly told them to leave the dead, the reason being that there were very few lads standing up and they were all shocked at what they had gone through. Realising that they were finished, I told them to get out of the Nalla to form all round defence where I had entered this hell hole. Whilst I went to talk to the CO on the set at Coy HQ, running back I called for the signallers to get the CO on the set. When he came on, and before I could speak he wanted to know what was happening. I had no doubt that the urgency in his voice was because of pressure for info coming from above. When I told him the attack was finished and that I wanted to abort this effort, he went crazy. I won’t say that words went on between us, but I was determined to have defensive fire from the Artillery to allow me to withdraw everyone out of it. “Wait”, was the message to me. Resting during this wait, I leaned against the side of the Nalla where Coy HO was positioned. My back was nearest to the side of Sugar 4 & 5, when a severe explosion occurred just above my head on the flat ground above me. It covered Coy HO in smoke and dust, my head was ringing with sound as I took stock of what had happened to the lads with me; fortune was with us, no one was hurt. Later it was found that the 18 set had a piece of shrapnel in it which somehow would not have allowed me to give any reply to Bn HO, yet at the same time it was able to receive. A message came through, the Gunners would commence the SOS fire in five minutes, so I ran off to 10 Platoon, ordering them to get out and to leave no wounded, informing them where to assemble. I then ran across the front to 11 Platoon ordering them out, on this occasion I had to help with the many wounded. All of our stretcher bearers had been carrying stretcher cases back, therefore, they were not present. We were dragging and helping the wounded out, when some of the SOS fire landed amongst us, cursing and blinding we took cover behind the trees or any fold in the ground.

Mercifully it was on one or two rounds, which really one could expect due to our close proximity to the Jap positions. Recovering our breath, the remnants of the two Platoons and Coy HO assembled, the count of the able bodied was 15 all told. The shelling and Jap small arms firing stopped in this now quiet track behind D Coy when Major Lyster-Todd appeared with a sack on his back. The Major had been our Company Commander a month or so prior to this attack, he was now doing the duties of 2nd Commander of the Battalion. Throwing down the sack he said to me “Sgt Major, that is your Company’s rum ration which you should have had before you went into the attack, I know you, and I say let the men have a good drink, they deserve it”.

Then he asked what was wrong with me, to which I replied “Nothing”. “Your eyes are completely bloodshot, you had better go and see the MO”. I felt foolish following the trail of blood to the Aid Post. Eventually the MO saw me and inspected my eyes. Knowing me, he gave me a mirror to look at my eyes which had burst blood vessels, making the whites of my eyes bloodshot. (The Major asked me to make a note of those who had done a job worthy of

distinction and let Battalion HO know. I asked the NCO’s and the men with me, the outcome being that I put forward two lads, L/Cpl Pennington and a lad called Beal. They were both awarded Immediate Military Medals.)

The story does not end there. We were given a position in the defensive chain on the right of our D Coy. Exhausted, I fell asleep when night set in, and was awakened with the cry of Scots voices calling out, “Gie us a hand to get our wounded out”. The Royal Scots had been sent in to do a night attack on Sugar 4 & 5 and had failed with heavy casualties, exact numbers I could not say. Unfortunately, as I looked at these shocked officers and men staggering past us it reminded me of just a short while ago when we looked like that. We could not go to the assistance of the lads they had to leave behind.

It is tragic when one reconsiders the whole situation, here was I, who now knew every part of the areas of attack which the Japanese held, what a pity no one had asked me to describe the area prior to this last attack on the positions.

In case readers and historians think it was a soft job, may I explain the layout and my opinion of the area.

As I explained previously, the open ground in front of us was studded with Jap defensive positions, to give you a complete picture, let me explain further. It was known that the Jap positions on the southern slopes of the Mayu Hills and seemed to be able to fire anywhere on the front. They had not been knocked out by the various means that were used by the Higher Command. It was also known that the Japs could dig themselves underground and make excellent shelters. Safely underground, they could bring their fire onto their own positions in front of them, giving protection to all their kin. Sugar 4 & 5 were the strongest positions in the area and every effort was being made to knock them out and afterwards the other positions could be dealt with. It appeared to me that the Nalla had hand and foot holds in its walls that had been removed and made safe. It would not surprise me to find out that they had actually deepened them, making a buttress wall of the side of the Nalla about ten feet high. In addition, the fox­holes that were at the top of the deep Nallas, and reported as abandoned, were in fact occupied when an attack came in. From these positions they dropped grenades on those in the trap of the Nalla. In my humble opinion it was a death trap. When my two platoons entered the Nalla they found this obstacle and so they deviated left and right in order to find an access to the bunkers above. 10 Platoon entering the mouth of the Chaung thought that they had found a nice run into these Jap positions, but the Japs were ready and they ran into a complete field on enemy fire, being shot at from many places, so much so that they were shot down in a complete group. They did not have a chance, whilst our Hierarchy write it of as feeble efforts. Those lads were my men, brave and keen when they went in.

In Summary

No enquiry was made into the faulty ammunition, I do know that back at the water-point a group of NCOs and men were given the task of taking boxes of ammunition from our Battalion dump and dropping it into a deep Chaung. Two of these involved in this job were Sgt Fred Collier (still alive) and John Foster (who died in 1998).

The Japs that we were fighting were all dressed in Jungle Green camouflage outfits, (we later met up with many of them) whereas the British were wearing a battle dress outfit made of light drill colour, along with white vests and towels which could be seen a mile away, so much for our camouflage. We had also to carry our mosquito nets into the front line and for the first few days we strung them up to protect us from the mosquitoes, but we realised that, in the event of an attack, they were an obstacle so they were dumped after a few days.

I could go on about seeing our Brigadier and Brigade Major tied to trees as the Japanese who had raided our Brigade HO at lndin were digging in around the Brigade Commander, daring us to shoot at them. Yes, they were leaning on their shovels making fun of us. I mentioned that we saw many of these as my Company, hurriedly called from our positions at the front, moved into Indin. We looked to our left and believe me there was a column of Japs only about 50 yards from us and we were both walking towards the sea. We stopped, and what a shoot up we had. The funny part of it was, the Japs kept coming on, they were just following their orders and following their Officer. The 3” mortars near us also joined in this shoot up. They fired HE until a Senior Officer of ours came along and said to the Mortar Platoon, “Fire smoke”, blinding the Japs to us. 

Being the only known senior survivor of the Durhams, I have a list of veterans who meet each year at York, and their addresses, should anyone wish to go further into my explanation of what happened atDonbaik.

This story could be told more vividly by an experienced writer, but when one has reached the age of nearly 83 ones mind does not work so lucidly.

Martin McLane

2nd Bn, The Durham Light Infantry The Royal Chelsea Hospital  London     SW3

Summer 2000 DEKHO!