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Retreat from Burma

The Chindits Expeditions 1943-1944

The Battle of Kohima

The Arakan Campaigns

Burma Victory  - Date: January 1943 to 3rd May 1945

Retreat from Burma

Following the loss of Malaya and Singapore it was obvious that Burma would be the next Japanese target, Lt-General T.J. Hutton was sent to take command, tasked with defending Burma, Particularly Rangoon and preparing for offensive operations against Siam. Hutton established northern supply depots once he realised how vulnerable Rangoon was.

Lt.General Hutton had only two division for the defence of Burma, the 17th Indian and 1st Burma. When The Japanese invaded Burma with elements of the Japanese Southern Army moving first, crossing the Kra Isthmus from Chumpon with a single battalion encountering no opposition and occupied Victoria Point and its important airfield on 16th December. Other battalions then drove north along the coastroad, through Tenasserim to Tavoy which they reached on 9th January, isolating Mergui and its airfield.

The next day, the Japanese 55th Division left Raheng in Thailand and drove west over the Burmese border to met the Southern Army at Moulmein, having thoroughly routed the British 16th Brigade at Kawkareik, the survivors staggering back towards Moulmein. The Japanese arrived at Moulmein on 30th January and the next day were already threatening Martaban and the road to Sittang, and Rangoon, both of which were already suffering from heavy Japanese air raids.

Sittang Bridge

Major-General Smuthe, VC knew he had to get his 17th British Division and its exhausted and inexperienced units first to the Bilin River and then to Sittang Bridge otherwise they would be trapped. His first requests to do so were refused by the inexperienced command staff and his troops had to fight desperately on the Bilin river and suffered heavy losses, only then to withdraw 20 miles along a dusty track under pressure from two Japanese who were provided with excellent air cover.

On the morning of 21st February, the 33rd Japanese Division had been kept at bay by the rearguards, but other Japanese forces had outflanked the British in the race to Sittang bridge. By evening, Smythe's HQ reached the bridge, set up defence posts and the transport of the division streamed across while three battalions of Gurkhas' fought off ferocious attacks by Japanese forces closing in from all sides.

Intelligence reports then warned of a possible parachute attack from behind, the main Gurkha force was cut off and Smythe was forced to leave them behind and blow the bridge. The bridge was blown at 0530 on the morning of 23rd February.

Thankfully, the Japanese immediately switched their attention to finding another crossing and the fit survivors of the rearguard swam the river but had to leave behind all their equipment and wounded. Who were all butchered as soon as they were found by the Japanese.

Rangoon Falls

General Smythe's Division now suffered yet another command foul-up, being ordered to leave the only good defensive position they had occupied behind the Sittang river. The 17th Division was now down to less than half  strength and had lost the bulk of its guns and transport, but the survivors reached Pegu where they were reinforced by 7th Armoured Brigade (7th Hussars and 2nd Royal tank Regiment) and re-equipped from the storehouses of Rangoon.

By now, some idea of the weakness of Burma command had reached the higher levels of authority in Delhi and London and Lt-General Sir Harold Alexander was on his way to take overall command with Lt-General William Slim to take command of the re-formed Burma Corps.

The end of February had seen the RAF and American Volunteer Corps catch the Japanese Air Force surprise and shoot down some 170 bombers and fighters, gaining command of the air over Rangoon while another Indian brigade and three more infantry battalions were brought in. The decision had been taken on 1st March to make every effort to hold Rangoon, by Wavell and Hutton, and the Chinese were advancing against Toungoo.

When General Sir Harold Alexander arrived in Rangoon he immediately decided to evacuate, and the evacuation of all British civilians, Army and RAF administration troops began. Alongside this, docks, oil installations, workshops and factories were destroyed. By the afternoon of 7th March, the city was burning and the last train had pulled out to the north and the last transports had left for Calcutta.

The Japanese arrived on the 8th March, and had looped around the northern edge of the city and entered from the west, very nearly cutting off and capturing General Alexander but the removal of a vital roadblock allowed the remaining British troops to escape.

As soon as General Sakurai, commanding the Japanese army, realised the British had left Rangoon he ordered pursuit up the only usable road, the Prome road, but was met by strong and organized resistance from the 17th Division which was now under the Command of General Slim. This slowed the Japanese advance and at Toungoo the 200th Chinese Division had stopped the Japanese on the banks of the Sittang.

By March 26th, however, the Chinese casualties were so great that they had to pull back and General Slim ordered the 17th division into the attack to take the pressure off the Chinese. The 17th Division drove the Japanese back almost to Okpo when it was realised that the Japanese were outflanking them again and they had cut the road at Shwedaung. The 17th Division turned and fought their way back into Prome by the end of the month, the last Chinese having evacuated Toungoo that day but failed to destroy the vital bridge. With Rangoon in Japanese hands, the British and Gurkha garrisons on the Adaman Islands were exposed and they were evacuated on 12th March, the Japanese occupied the islands on the 23rd March.

On 17 March, Major Calvert (17th Division) led a Royal Marine raid on the Irrawaddy port of Henzada and attacked a force of dissident Burmese under Japanese officers. At the same time, the 1st Gloucesters surprised and drove away a Japanese battalion billeted at Letpadan, 80 miles south of Prome, inflicting heavy casualties. Heavy Japanese air attacks had driven the RAF out of Burma between 21st and 27th March, with 97 RAF aircraft lost, by this time the Japanese had lost some 291 aircraft.

Withdrawal from Burma

With Toungoo captured by the Japanese, the Japanese army commander General Lida planned to advance north along three rivers. Along the Irrawaddy against the Burma Corps, the Sittang against the Chinese fifth army and along the Salween against the Chinese sixth army.

The Japanese forces on the astern flank had taken Mauchi by the beginning of April and were driving up towards Bawlake and Loikaw. The Japanese outflanked and scattered the Chinese 55th Division by the middle of the month, cut the escape routes behind the remnants by racing along the narrow tracks across the Salween and on 21st April reached and occupied Hoping. The Chinese Sixth army was by this time disintegrating and its commander took his remaining units and headed east and then north back into China. The road to Lashio, the only line of supply and communications for the Chinese armies was now open to attack.

General Slims' forces were well-disposed and organised for a strong  defence of the country east of Magwe, but were without air cover, the Japanese air forces having driven the RAF and American Volunteer groups out of Burma. General Ilda's forces closed on the British and attacked. On 16th April, Slim was forced to begin a withdrawal after first ordering the destruction of millions of gallons of oil, which turned Yenangyaung's oil installations and storehouses into one vast sheet of flame.

The Burcorps held the Japanese south of Manadalay assisted by the Chinese 65th Army but when Alexander realised that Lashio was abut to fall he decided to concentrate on the defence of India. He ordered Slim to withdraw across the Irrawaddy to Kalewa and after some problems getting the main forces across the Ava brigade all went well until it was learned, on 29th April, that the Japanese had not only captured Lashio and the Burma road was cut, but had outflanked Burcops once more. They would capture Monywa by 1st May.

The Chinese 5th Army poured north after holding the central Japanese thrust for the last days of April, and had at one point reoccupied Taunggyi and threatened the Japanese advance on Lashio by driving east.

Stilwell's forces suffered from a break down of administration and disintegrated. Stilwell escaped back to Shwebo and was forced to walk to the Chindwin and through the hills to Imphal and then Assam.

The Japanese drive continued on the western flank, along the coast to Akyab and along the Chindwin driving Burcops back towards Assam. On 12th May the monsoon broke and stopped the Japanese pursuit dead in its track as well as turning the British retreat into a misery of soaking, mud-caked bone-chilling discomfort.

Some transport struggled out from India to meet the Columns and managed to get most of the very sick and wounded aboard. The survivors of Burcops struggled back into India after an epic retreat of a thousand miles. It had lasted five and a half months and cost 10,036 British, Indian and Gurkha Soldiers.

By 2nd May all Burma was under Japanese control.

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The Chindit Expeditions 1943-1944.
Location: Burma, Southern Asia.


On February 13 1943, British Army Brigadier Orde Wingate addressed the men under his command: "Today we stand on the threshold of battle. The time of preparation is over, and we are moving on the enemy to prove ourselves and our methods. We need not, as we go forward into the conflict, suspect opportunity of withdrawing and are here because we have chosen to bear the burden and the heat of the day."

Wingate was the commander of a force which became known as the Chindits, the long range penetration group which he had formed for operations behind the Japanese lines in Burma. The name was taken from the Chindits distinctive arm badge of Chinthe, or stone line, which guarded the entrance to Burmese stone temples.

The 40-year-old Wingate was one of the most remarkable commanders of the war. Born into a family of Plymouth Brethren, he had become an ardent Zionist and specialist in guerrilla warfare. In 1936, while serving in the British Army in Palestine, Wingate had organised Special Night Squads to combat Arab insurgents. In the 1940-41 campaign in Ethiopia, he commanded a mobile group, known as Gideon Force, which successfully raised the local tribes against the Italians.

Bearded, covered with eczma and frequently to be seen with an alarm clock dangling incongruously from the belt of his battledress, Wingate was a massively eccentric figure who attracted as many enemies as admirers. Some through him a genius, others a madman. Wingate compared himself with Napoleon. After a frustrating stint as a staff officer, during which he attempted suicide, Wingate arrived in India in 1942, where he was given the task of forming a small force of fast-moving guerrillas, supplied by air, who would take on the Japanese in their own element, the jungle.

Map: 1st Chindit Operation

The Chindits, officially designated 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and comprising British, Gurkha and Burmese troops, underwent a period of gruelling training at Wingate's hands. By the beginning of February 1943, they were ready to conduct their first independent raid behind enemy lines.

Wingate divided his 3,250 men into two groups, each consisting of a number of columns of about 450 men and 100 mules. Detachments of RAF radio operators maintained contact with the aircraft tasked with dropping supplies. Each man carried some 60lb (27kg) of equipment, including rifle, bayonet, ammunition and grenades, water bottle, four pairs of socks, spare shirt, climbing rope, utility knife and a five day ration pack, consisting of biscuits, cheese, nuts and raisins, dates, tea, sugar, milk and chocolate.

The smaller group, two columns strong and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Leigh Alexander, crossed the Chindwin River and struck south to attack the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway at Kyaikthin, 120 miles (190km) north of Mandalay. Wingate, accompanying the five columns led by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Cooke, planned to cut the same railway between Wuntho and Indaw, to the north.

Wingate drove his men hard through the mountainous Burmese jungle, a series of seemingly endless green-clad ridges and valleys. In this pitiless environment, the Japanese were only one of the enemies which the Chindits would face. There was the torrential rain which produced seas of glutinous mud and permanently sodden clothes. Dense thickets of prickly bamboo slashed clothes and flesh to ribbons. Like Wingate, many of the Chindits wore beards which obviated the need for a shaving kit, provided good face camouflage in the jungle war of ambush and stalking, and kept out the mosquitoes and ticks.

Progress was painfully slow but by the beginning of March Cooke's group was positioned to attack the railway. On March 2nd, the column led by Major Bernard Fergusson brushed aside a Japanese patrol and blew the bridge at Bongyaung, the sound of the explosion rolled around the hills as Fergusson's mules kicked and plunged in panic.

The Japanese response was swift. Two divisions were despatched to deal with the intruders, whom the Japanese, unaware of the Chindits air supply, believed to be on a reconnaissance rather than a raiding mission. The Japanese net closed in on the two Chindit groups, and a series of vicious close quarters engagements erupted in the jungle. One of Alexander's columns and its headquarters were ambushed. Survival often depended on surprise. One night, Ferguson crept into a village and approached four men sitting around a fire to ask its name. Only at the last moment did he realise they were Japanese. As they turned towards Fergusson, he tossed a grenade with a four second fuse into the fire, killing them all.

Rather than withdraw, and jeopardise the Chindits' future. Wingate pressed deeper into enemy territory towards the Irrawaddy river. Leaving his force two rivers to cross when they fell back to India. Wingate crossed the Irrawaddy on March 19 and linked up with the columns led by Fergusson and Major Michael 'Mad Mike' Calvert. But now the Chindits found themselves in heavily patrolled, open, waterless territory which was totally unsuited to guerrilla operations.

The commander of British IV Corps, Lieutenant-General Sconnes, ordered Wingate to withdraw. Wingate in turn instructed both groups to disperse in small, independent parties.

Alexander's group shifted to the east, hoping to reach the safety of China, while the northern group fell back on the Irrawaddy.

The men were now exhausted and riddled with disease. the wounded had to be left behind. One of them, Lieutenant Philip Stibbe of Fergusson's column, later recalled his first night alone: 'As it grew dark I heard a lot of rustling in the leaves near where I lay and, to my horror, I saw several large spiders about the size of my hand crawling towards me. No doubt they were attracted by the smell of blood. It was a beastly sensation lying there unable to move while these loathsome creatures crawled nearer.'

Stibbe was captured by the Japanese but survived the war.

One by one the small groups of Chindits completed the nightmarish return march to cross the Chindwin. Of the force which had set out nearly three months before, over 800 were lost, killed or wounded, many of them in the last stages of their March, where the Japanese lay in wait for them.

Numbers of the survivors were so debilitated that they never saw combat again.

On the face of it, the first Chindit campaign had not been a success. the Chindits had cut a few railway lines - which were quickly repaired - and killed several hundred Japanese. But they had achieved a tremendous psychological victory when it was needed most, taking the fight to the enemy and in the process undermining the myth of Japanese invincibility in the jungle.

As a result, the Chindit force was expanded to six infantry brigades, totalling some 23,000 men. Wingate was promoted to Major-General and given a 'private air force' - 25 transports, 12 bombers, 30 fighters, 100 spotters and 225 gliders of the USAAF's No. 1 Air Commando.

By March 1944 the Chindits operated southwest of Myitkyina against the Japanese rear while the latter were conducting the U-Go offensive against Imphal and Kohima. The air-supplied strongholds established by the Chindits tied down two and a half enemy divisions, but on the evening of March 24 Wingate was killed when the Mitchell bomber in which he was flying crashed into a hillside south-west of Imphal. Under their new commander, Brigadier William 'Joe' Lentaigne, the Chindits were then moved north to support General Stilwell's Chinese-American Army whose advance on Myitkyina had been held-up by stubborn Japanese resistance.

By the second week in July the Chindits had reached the limit of their endurance. But the hardbitten 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell, who had misused the lightly armed Chindits in assaults on heavily defended positions, a role for which they had not been trained, refused all requests to relive them.

Finally, he was sternly reminded by British Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, 'If they are not soon relieved we may both be faced with the ... accusation of keeping men in battle who are unable to defend themselves.' 

Stilwell chose to keep the remaining fit men on garrison duty, but by the end of August the rest of the Chindits had been flown out to India. losses were 5,000 men. It can be argued that more was demanded of the Chindits than any other Allied troops in the war.

They responded magnificently.

77th Indian Infantry Brigade
February 1943 Northern (No.2) Group Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier O.C. Wingate) 
Group Headquarters (Lt-Colonel S.A. Cooke)
No.3 Column (Major J.M.Clavert)
No.4 Column (Major R.B.G. Bromhead)
No.5 Column (Major B.E. Fergusson)
No.7 Column (Major K.D. Gilkes)
No.8 Column (Major W.P. Scott)
2nd Burma Rifles (Lt. Colonel L.G. Wheeler)
Independent Mission (Captain D.C. Herring)

Southern (No.1) Group
Group Headquarters (Lt. Colonel L.A. Alexander)
No.1 Column (Major G. Dunlop)
No.2 Column (Major A. Emmett)
142nd Commando Company (Major J.B. Jeffries)


Each Column was a self-contained unit with its own fighting troops, medical, signals and air liaison sections, sabotage group and platoon of scouts, guides and interpreters. Column establishments were:
British Column Gurkha Column
Officers 1718
Other Ranks 289351


Total Strength 306369
Horses 1515
Mules 100100
Anti-Tank Rifles 44
Mortars 22
Heavy machine-guns 22
Light machine-guns 99
Light AA machine-guns 22

 

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The Battle of Kohima

Type: Air/Land Action.
Date: April 5th to June 22nd 1944.
Location: Imphal and Kohima, Indian/Burmese border.

Axis force involved in this campaign; Nation Air units Naval Units Army units
Japanese 15th Army

Kohima and Imphal

On March 6th 1944, the Japanese launched the U-Go offensive in northern Burma. U-Go had twin aims: to pre-empt the Allies own plans to retake Burma and to break into India itself. The failure of successive British offensives in the Arakan, the steamy  coastal region from which it was hoped it would be possible to gain access to central Burma, had reinforced the Japanese high command's low opinion of their opponent's abilities as jungle fighters. They were confident of victory, but were soon to be taught a terrible lesson.

The gateway to India lay through the isolated border town of Imphal in the then district of Manipur. A 130-miles (210km) road wound north from Imphal to the hill town of Kohima before running on to the railhead at Dimapur.

It was Kohima's only contact with the outside world and would link the two remote settlements in the high hills of Assam in some of the most savage fighting of the war.

Two divisions of the Japanese 15th Army, commanded by the hot-tempered General Renya Mutaguchi, crossed the Chindwin River and moved on Imphal. The third headed for Kohima. Both the Japanese and the British were operating under severe disadvantages. Time was not on Mutaguchi's side.

Once battle was joined, his troops could rely on no more than a month's supplies. In May, the monsoon would arrive, making offensive operations all but impossible. In contrast, the commander of the British 14th Army, General William Slim, had been preparing to go over to the offensive and was not best placed to receive an attack in a sector where there were such poor communications and few facilities for the basing of large numbers of troops now committed to the front. Nevertheless, Slim had one invaluable advantage. under his superb leadership, Fourteenth Army had been transformed from the shattered force which had been driven out of Burma in the spring of 1942 into a highly motivated army. but it had yet to fight a full-scale battle against experienced Japanese troops who had been ordered by the super-aggressive Mutaguchi to fight to the death.

The British were prepared for the Japanese thrust. Ample evidence of the build-up was provided by aerial reconnaissance. Nevertheless, Slim was surprised by its initial speed. By April 5 the Japanese had cut the Imphal-Kohima road and isolated the settlements. Slim ordered his subordinate commanders not to withdraw without permission from higher authority. It was imperative to deny the Japanese the mountain roads which led down into the Indian plain. Imphal and Kohima, the latter situated on a saddle ridge which in happier days was bright with forests of tropical flowers, would have to be held at all costs.

At Kohima, last-minute reinforcements were rushed in from Dimapur by the commander of the British XXXIII Corps, Lieutenant-general Montagu Stopford. two battalions, supported by artillery, were positioned 2 miles (3km) west of Kohima itself on the highest hill in the ridge, later to become known as Garrison Hill.

Fighting began on the 30th as General Sato's 31st division pushed back the scattered units of the Assam Rifles and other regiments which were defending the approaches to Kohima. The commander at Kohima, Colonel Hugh Richards, had a force of approximately 1200 men to resist the all-out attack of 12,000 Japanese jungle veterans. He had to rely on the arrival of a breakthrough force from Dimapur, the British 2nd Division, without which his defences would be overwhelmed.

The Japanese arrived on April 5. In the teeth of desperate resistance they took the strongpoints on the hills and hummocks around Kohima. The pattern of the battle was now set.

Men crouched in slit trenches sometimes only yards away from the enemy. One officer of the West Kents calculated that from the plop of a grenade being fired to its arrival was no more than 14 seconds. The intensity of Japanese artillery, mortar and sniper fire in suck a small space meant that movement between units was virtually impossible by day and extremely hazardous at night.

Few of the men locked in this fight for survival had a clear idea of what was happening beyond the lip of their own trench.  Day and night the British and Indian troops were subjected to Japanese  broadcast appeals to them to surrender. Sato's aim was to exhaust the defenders of Kohima. Japanese artillery was most active at dawn and sunset, shredding nerves as well as destroying targets. When darkness fell, the Allied troops stood to in the dark before the moon rose, straining to catch the rustle of Japanese infiltrators moving behind them. As one of Kohmia's defenders observed, this stoked the fear that when he awoke the occupants of the next gunpit might be the enemy.

On April 11 Stopford sent 5th British Infantry Brigade up the Dimapur-Kohima road. Two days later it had smashed its way through to the Jotsoma 'box' held by 161st Brigade. by now, the situation at Kohima was desperate. A message was sent to the 5th Brigade that unless help arrived within 48 hours Kohima would fall: 'The men's spirits are all right but there aren't many of us left....'

On the 17th the Japanese launched their fiercest attack on the slopes of Garrison Hill. Phosphorous bombardments were followed by howling infantry assaults with grenades and machine-guns. To the din was added the fire of the defenders' howitzers.

By the night of the 18th the men holding Garrison Hill were on their last legs. One young private asked Colonel Richards, 'When we die, sir, is that the end or do we go on?'

The Japanese swarmed everywhere but were unable to mount a co-ordinated battalion-strength attack which would have spelled the end at Kohima. The ground around Garrison Hill - just 350 yards (320m) square - was now all that was left of the perimeter which had held on April 5. But the men of the West Kents hung on until dawn of the 20th when troops of the Royal Berkshires, the advance guards of 2nd Division, broke in to relieve them.

The stench of rotting corpses was so thick on Garrison Hill that many of the Berkshires were physically sick as they dug in on the battle-scarred hill, whose blasted trees were festooned with blackened shreds of the parachutes used in the air supply of the Kohima garrison.

The evacuation of the West Kents did not mean the end of the battle. The Japanese still occupied most of the Kohima massif and would have to be driven off amid the downpours of the monsoon, which brought with it mud, malaria and dysentry. 

The most savage fighting of the battle erupted in mid-May. The sliver of ground at stake was the British Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and its adjacent tennis court. This had been seized on April 9 by the Japanese, who had built a warren of bunkers and weapons pits on the surrounding terraced hillside. The task of winkling out the Japanese was given to the men of the 2nd Battalion Dorsetshire regiment. It was a dirty business made more difficult by the terrain which denied the Dorsets any armoured support. A solution was found by the Royal Engineers who cut a path to a spur behind the bungalow. They then winched a Grant tank up and pushed it down the slope. It came to rest on the baseline of the tennis court, where its commander, Sergeant Waterhouse of the 149 Royal Tank Regiment poured a hail of fire into the Japanese bunkers at no more than 20 yards (18m) range. 

The Japanese fled on to the waiting rifles of the Dorsets. Only the chimney stack of the bungalow remained. The rest of the landscape around was a shell-churned rubbish dump alive with rats. When he saw it, General Stopford compared it with the Somme in 1916: 'One could tell how desperate the fighting had been.'

By now the Japanese had run out of time, supplies and ammunition. On May 31, Sato ordered his men to withdraw to Imphal. Exhausted and riddled with disease, they were harried all the way by the Allies. Imphal was relieved on June 22, after over 80 days of siege, and now it was the turn of Mutaguchi to throw in the towel. Early in July, his 15th Army pulled out, the survivors struggling down liquefied roads to cross the Chindwin on to the burma plains. Only 20,000 of the 85,000 Japanese who had come to invade India were left standing.

Slim now had a springboard for the reconquest of Burma. The cost to the Allies had been 17,857 British and Indian troops killed, wounded and missing. the dead at Kohima have their own simple and moving monument which bears the epitah: 'When you go home, tell them of us, and say: "For your tomorrow, we gave our today".'

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The Arakan Campaigns

December 1942 to April 1944.
Location: The Arakan, Burma
British Army units
14th Indian Division
123rd Indian Brigade
47th Indian Brigade
5th Indian Division
7th Indian Division
6th British brigade
And Others



First Arakan Campaign

In September 1942, General Wavell had issued directives for a British return to Burma, and the same month the 14th Indian Division left Chittagong on a journey south through Cox's Bazar and down to the bottom of the Mayu Peninsula. The only road south was a four-foot wide track, and although the heavy supplies were sent by sea part of the way, much had to be carried by the troops and progress was almost imperceptible.

Thirteen inches of rain fell on one day in November and monsoon conditions reigned in the Bay of Bengal, but by the beginning of December the division was slogging towards Cox's Bazar towards Tumbru and Bawli Bazar where the two brigades separated, one holding to the coast and the other driving parallel on the left for Buthidaung as the first drove for Maungdaw. A flank guard of irregulars operated inland to provide intelligence led by Lt-Colonel J.H. Souther.

On arrival, the brigades found Japanese units holding strong defences along the line of the road between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, and were then instructed to wait for the arrival of two more brigades, 123rd and 47th Indian Brigades who arrived on 17th December. It was then discovered that the Japanese had withdrawn into the Peninsula itself, but it was January before the Division was ready to move forward again.

The Japanese had in fact dropped back into strong defences around and south of Kondan protecting the town of Rathedang. The Japanese waited and watched and even allowed a patrol from the 47th Indian Brigade to reach Foul Point, but when first a company and then a battalion attempted to follow up a week later than ran into a well-laid trap of fox-holes deep in the scrub.

The 14th Indian Division pressed forward, while more battalions of the 47th Indian Brigade followed on down the Mayu Peninsula and attempted to storm Donbaik and the Japanese defence lines in vain. Units from 123rd Brigade split on both sides of the Mayu river, one battalion attempting a direct attack on Rathedaung itself, the rest trying to take Kondon from the north.

The Japanese positions held and while the two Indian Brigades were battling fiercely but making little headway a new Japanese division was being assembled under an expert commander to take advantage of the extended positions of the Indian units.

Throughout February and March, the Kondan-Donbaik- Rathedaung triangle was the scene of bitter fighting. March saw Wavell release the experienced the British Brigade to mount an assault on Donbaik and a new force was created to guard the eastern Arakan flank. However, by the end of the month the growing evidence pointed toward a powerful Japanese threat growing across the Kaladan, and the British and Indian units in the Arakan had lost over 3,300 killed and wounded during the attack on Donbaik. All close observers were convinced that the whole enterprise had been ill-advised from the start.

During February and March 1943 the first Chindit Operations had taken place. Wavell, however, did not agree and rejected the advice of General Lloyd, commander of 14th Division and dismissed him, replacing him with General Lomax who was more optimistic. Wavell and Lomax exhorted the units east of the Mayu range to 'stick it out' and the survivors of the 6th British Brigade to hold fast around Donbaik. Both men felt the approaching monsoons would enable the brigades to build up their strength for success when the monsoon ended. They did not take account of the rising toll from malaria.

On 1st April, the 47th Brigade commander realised that the Japanese were infiltrating between his positions and moving towards the coast. He abandoned his heavy equipment and made for the coast. However, a Japanese column was well-ahead of him and had a roadblock set up on 3rd Arpil at Indin. 6th Brigade units destroyed this and the orders were, at last, issued for a complete withdrawal from the Peninsula back to the Buthidaung-Maungdaw line, but two nights later a strong Japanese force surrounded Indian and captured the Brigade commander and his staff, all of whom died in a reportedly barbaric fashion not far off in the jungle.

The remaining British and Indian troops marched northwards as the Japanese planned to occupy the tunnels of the Buthidaung position and pursue the British out of the Arakan. On 14th April Lt-General William J. Slim was appointed to command all troops in the area.

At the beginning of May, the Survivors of the 14th Indian Division were back behind the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line and the Japanese 55th Division was pressing them hard. General Slim had a hope of salvaging something and sent down two fresh brigades but once he realised the condition of the men of the 14th Division he made plan for a further gradual withdrawal.

On 3rd May, a battalion of Lancashire Fusiliers was attacked in their positions on the left flank. The Japanese drove through and across the Tunnels road and there was no practical alternative to a hasty withdrawal to the new line curving up from Nhili to Bawli and Goppe Bazars, then down across the Mayu. There the Japanese were content to leave the British almost undisturbed.

The first Arakan campaign had been a failure, the chief reason being as Wavell said 'a small part of the Army was set a task beyond their training and capacity'. General Slim would see that such did not happen again.

The Second Arakan Campaign

After months of training, re-arming and resupplying during which the Japanese left the British alone, General Slim sent out the 5th Indian Division in late December. The 5th moved carefully down from Bawli Bazar to re-establish positions on the west of the Mayu range. At the beginning of 1944, the leading formations came up against the Japanese defence lines running from Maungdaw to Buthidaung. For nearly a week the 5th Indian and the Japanese fought a series of bitter battles north of Maungdaw.

A pause was called for regrouping and on 9th January the Indians mounted a full-scale attack on the port. They found that during the previous night the Japanese defenders had slipped away and left them the wrecked and derelict port. Attempts to move further south were fiercely blocked and the line became static once again.

At the same time, the 7th Indian Division had prepared to move down from Taung Bazar to Buthidaung to attack the inner end of the Japanese defence line. The advance went well until news arrived that the Japanese 55th Division had cut across behind them to capture Taung bazar and then to cut the Divisions' supply routes both in the north and near Ngakyedauk Pass.

An adequate defence force was quickly organized to hold Maungdaw, and the bulk of both Indian Divisions concentrated into an 'Admin Box' near Sinzweya. The engagement then became an exercise in technique. Both Indian divisions fought off every attack with cool success under sound leadership. The first attempts to supply them by air were beaten off by Japanese fighters and two more attempts to relieve them were blocked. But everyday, more Allied aircraft appeared, food and ammunition were dropped in on 11th February and from then on quite regularly, and on 5th February 1944, a relieving brigade broke through Okeydoke Pass and at the end of the month the Japanese called off the siege and withdrew.

Buthidaung was taken by the 7th Indian Division on 11th March and it soon became evident that there was little to prevent an advance down the whole peninsula and onto Akyab.

On 7-8th March, the Japanese General Mutaguchi launched the forward units of his 15th Army on 'Operation U-Go', the March to Delhi. Its primary objective being the capture of the huge stores and administration centre at Imphal, from where the British intended to launch their own 'March on Rangoon'. 

Three Japanese divisions were sent across the Chindwin to accomplish this by 12th March, the 33rd Division was marching along the Manipur, their right flank at Witok, heading for Imphal. They had met little opposition, the British forces in the area watching and waiting until it became evident that this was a serious invasion and then moved back onto the Imphal plain to protect the vital stores. By the time the Japanese 33rd Division reached Torbung, the first block was in place, while on the right the 20th Indian Division was at Shenan Saddle well before the Japanese 15th Division had reached the Shenan Saddle, where they intended to meet up with the right wing of the 33rd Division.

In the north the 31st Division under Mutaguchi made exceptional progress despite the poor conditions. On the map they had only 75 miles to march, but in fact they had covered well over 100 miles by the time they reached Jessami and were still 20 miles from Kohima. They had travelled mainly along tortuous paths over jungle-covered mountains.

In the meantime, General Slim had been busy. He had flown the 5th Indian Division to Imphal from the Arakan and troops were moving down from Manipur and the whole Imphal area was transformed into an armed camp.

Another threat also loomed over U-Go. The 77th Brigade of Wingate's Chindits was flown into the area south-west of Myitkyina on the night of 5-6th March where they had set up a defended perimeter, there they were joined by another brigade which was flown in and the 16th Brigade which  marched in from Ledo. By the time Mutaguchi's divisions were approaching Imphal and Kohima, Wingate's brigades had established trree strongholds, Broadway, White City and Aberdeen from where they intended to take control  f the area and cut all Japanese communications.

The Japanese 18th Division was forced out of Hukawang valley by the Chinese and the two Chinese division then combined to chase them out of Maingkwan, while Merrill's Marauders raced down to Waladum where they cut off the Japanese on 7th march and inflicted quite heavy losses. This pattern continued for the remainder of the month. A hard battle was fought at Ingkangahtawang but Japanese units from the area managed to rescue the 18th Division survivors on the last day of March.

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Burma Victory

Date: January 1943 to 3rd May 1945.

With the Japanese in control of Burma, the Burma road cut, and the Japanese were in a position to Attack and possibly conquer India. The only Supplies the Allies could get to China were by flying the 'hump' route. An air-ferry service which cleared the Himalayas at an altitude of 23,000 feet.

The Allies put great importance on keeping the Chinese in the war and therefore tying down a third of the Japanese army. It was therefore vital to reopen the Burma road somehow. 

The Americans put enormous resources into the Burma campaign. By the end of 1942, the British were once more thinking of Offensive operations.

A new and strange British commander had been appointed, this was Brigadier Order Wingate, an officer who had already acquired a reputation in Abyssinia. He had managed to sell Churchill the idea of long-range penetration and between February and May 1943 waged a private war beyond Chindwin where his men cut the railway from Mandalay to Myitkyina in seventy-five places during March.

The Survivors of the Chindits returned after suffering immense hardships, and abandoning considerable numbers of sick and wounded to the Japanese, who for their part reacted very little to these pinprick attacks. The press made much of these attacks in an attempt to bolster morale after the retreat of 1942. Wingate was responsible for dispensing with the annoying myth that the Japanese were invincible in the jungle. He was also responsible for demonstrating the new technique of air supply. It also offset the failure of attempts in early 1943 to recapture Akyab and its important airfield, by means of an advance down the Arakan coast.

In August 1943, South East Asia Command (SEAC) was formed. The Supreme commander was Lord Louis Mountbatten, who already had an intimate knowledge of inter-service co- operation, and was an inspiring leader. He knew that the men of the Fourteenth Army, including British, India, Gurkha and African, had to be made to believe they could beat the Japanese. They had to learn to move, fight and live in the jungle.

Malaria, Dysentry, Mite Typhus and Skin Troubles were the chief diseases that caused the army no end of headaches. 120 men were evacuated sick for every one wounded. At the end of 1942, One division had 5,000 sick out of a total strength of 17,000. In some units hardly enough men were left to look after the mules and drive the vehicles.

The Strictest health precautions were imposed. Research into tropical diseases' Introduction of Mepacrine and other drugs and the treatment of the sick in forward areas instead of evacuating them to India meant an absence from duty of weeks instead of months. The arrival of forward surgical teams; Evacuation by light aircraft from airstrips cut out of the jungle or ricefield, the innovation of jeep ambulances; and the gallant work of the devoted medical staff an volunteers-all served to to diminish  the ravages of disease and to increase the chances of recovery for the wounded.

Mountbatten's immediate aim was straightforward. It was to re-establish communications with China. The methods to achieve this were highly complex, there was to be an offensive in northern Burma in the winter of 1943-4. The Ledo Road from Assam, which was under construction was to be extended so as to join the old Burma Road at Mongyu near Lashio. A pipeline was to be built from Calcutta to Assam, and another parallel to the Ledo road. Supplies flown over the 'hump' were to be doubled to 20,000 tons a month. Advanced bases were to be set up in China, from which Allied aircraft could bomb Japan and Manchukuo.

The main objective was Myitkyina with its three airfields. Once they were in Allied hands in would be possible to Shorten the journey to China and cut out the rigorous climb over the Hump. 

Three Allied offensives were to take place simultaneously.

Stilwell's Chinese-American Army (Two Chinese Divisions trained in India and 'Merrill's Marauders') was to thrust down the Chindwin to Myitkyina. The Chindits were flown into Burma to cut the communications of the Japanese facing Stilwell and to disrupt an expected offensive into Manipur. In the Araken XV Corps under Lieutenant-General Alexander Frank Philip Christison was to retake Akyab.

The British offensive in the Arakan was violently counter-attacked. the Japanese in their usual fashion went round the flanks and got behind their opponents. There was of lack of confusion and affright, hospitals and headquarters were overrun. However, the British stuck tight instead of pulling out, formed Brigade and Divisional Boxes and hung on. This was possible was totally due to the Allied command of the air, The British at last had a secure line of communications and supply.

On 15 March 1944, The Japanese took the offensive. They meant to get into the Brahmaputra valley and overrun the airfields which were supplying China. Had they succeeded they might well have taken East India.

The Battle lasted three months. By the beginning of June the two armies were strangely interlocked; In the north, the two British Divisions around Kohima between them and Imphal two Japanese divisions; Around Imphal and Palel four more British divisions; and south of them a Japanese division and brigade.

Outnumbered two to one, the Japanese eventually cracked and recrossed the Chindwin in disorder. They lost most of their tanks and lorries, estimates are they also lost 250 guns and 53,000 men. The Fourteenth Army suffered though, 167,000 casualties, but not a single gun was lost. 

A 13 day siege was waged by the Japanese at Kohima. Colonel H. U. Richards held out with a scratch garrison some 2,500 string, whose main units were the 4th Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment and the 1st Assam regiment. A series of attacks gradually reduced the perimeter. Their main water supply was lost and by the end , men were crawling out to get water from a spring only 30 yards from a Japanese position. No-man's land was the width of a Tennis court. The resistance was relieved by the 5th Division which was flown in. The defenders made their last stand on Garrison Hill and survived until the 5th arrived. 

Meanwhile, the Chindits whose leader had been killed in a plane crash, waged their second campaign. Their chief accomplishment was to delay two infantry and one artillery battalions of the Japanese army for a couple of months which were on their way to take part in the Vital battle for Imphal.

Stilwell advanced slowly and it was not until 4 August that he took Myitkyina.

In December, The British crossed the Chindwin and the Japanese retired to the Irrawaddy. Slim brought up his left hand corps to his right flank and effected a crossing of the Irrawaddy south of Mandalay confusing the Japanese. The 14th Army improvised a flotilla to cross the river.

By the end of February 1945, the 14th Army had reached the vital communications centre of Meiktila. bitter fighting followed. 

Meanwhile, the Arakan XV Corps suddenly come to life again and in a fast moving amphibious campaign retook Akyab on the 3rd January, and inflicted a sharp reverse on the Japanese at Myebon on 12-3 January.

General Kimura's reserves were exhausted after the fighting in Meiktil, Mandalay and the great battle for central Burma. Too late he decided to withdraw and the 14th Army beat him in the race for Toungoo, Largely because of a well-organized and positioned force of Karen Guerrillas delaying the Japanese with ambush after ambush.

Could the British reach Rangoon before the monsoon could break? On the 3rd May the British won that race too. With the Japanese Army scattered and in pieces all over Burma, they were defeated. All that remained was to mop up.

The 'Forgotten Army' should not be forgotten for its work in the most adversarial of conditions, it was always on the end of the list for supplies, and still triumphed over a remarkable enemy in miserable conditions.

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