THE AIR OFFENSIVE OVER BURMA

Report published to journalists by the Reference Division of the Ministry of Information:

THE AIR OFFENSIVE OVER BURMA 15.1.43

Previous to the recent advance by Field. Marshal Wavell’s army into Burma, an immense intensification of air activity was noticeable over Burma. The steady flow of the communiqués reporting this activity was in itself unwanted, and necessarily gave rise to speculation as to whether an offensive was being projected. On both sides, land patrols were increasingly lively, striking through a sort of no man’s land on the fringes of occupied Burma to see what the others were doing. Dense jungle made air reconnaissance difficult, but even during the monsoon, in some of the worst weather in which man has ever flown, our aircraft had kept up their patrols.  Even before the advance began, there could have been no doubt that in the air, at any rate, the United Nations held the initiative. The closest collaboration has been and is  being maintained between General Bissel at the head of the 10th U.S.A.A.F. and the operational commanders of the R.A.F. in India.  While the RAF has been concerning itself with Japanese communications and airfields in Central and Southern Burma, for the most part, the U.S.A.A.F. has concentrated on targets such as docks, oil plants and industrial objectives for which the American bombers with their long range and heavy bomb-load are particularly suitable, The U.S.A.A.F. is also bombing those airfields, especially Myitkyina, in North Burma, which menace the American ferry service between India and China, but which has not, so far, been intercepted. Instead, the Japanese are known to be taking defensive measures on these airfields, increasing their air protection and. building bays, or earthen walls, for their aircraft. 

The present state of affairs in Burma is at least partly the result of operations which have been in progress over a much longer period of time than it would seem at first sight – since, in fact, the end of the Burma campaign in May 1942. In operations during the monsoon, from June to September, R.A.F., bombers carried out 104 raids on Japanese objectives in Burma. Akyab, the important rice exporting centre in the Bay of Bengal, was the chief of these; 25 raids were made on it, the main targets being airfields, docks and rice mills, The Irrawaddy, with its many mouths, was another important objective; enemy craft on some of the rivers were attacked as many as 27 times.  Combined bomb and machine-gun attacks were another feature of that offensive.  At Kalemyo, Japanese troops were bombed and machine-gunned 11 times. The airfield at Myitkyina was raided 6 times, Magwe airfield, 5 times. During October, a. further 20 raids were made over Burma. 8 Japanese aircraft were destroyed in the course of the operations.  Meanwhile, in the North-West mountain area, forces mainly Chinese, with some refugees and rescue parties cut off at the end of the campaign, were being steadily supplied from the air by the R.A.F. 

In November, the number of raids made by the R.A.F. over Burma further increased to 30. Rangoon, and especially its principal airfield at Mingaladen, was attacked by our bombers for the first time since the monsoon began, and other airfields, as well railway objectives, were repeatedly raided. Low-level attacks on Japanese sea and river shipping also became a feature of our fighters, operating from India. The most striking fact emerging from all this is the almost entire absence of any losses in aircraft on our part.  Among other objectives, Akyab was raided 6 times, Rangoon 5 times, Meiktila 5 times, Magwe 4 times, Mandalay twice. Targets have been airfields (runways and. buildings), oil installations, railway lines, stations yards and trains, army huts and other buildings in Japanese hands, objectives in river areas, and shipping. In some cases fighter escort has been provided; bombing appears to have been accurate and good results were observed. On one night (21/22.11.42) Mingaladen and Toungoo airfields were attacked by medium and heavy bombers “operating on an increased scale”; many thousands of pounds of high explosive were dropped, and fires started which were visible 80-100 miles away. In both day and night raids, the only bombers specifically mentioned by name have been Blenheims and Wellingtons; the only fighters, Hudsons and Hurricanes, but there is no reason to believe that these are the only types employed over Burma. On many occasions no enemy fighter opposition or anti-aircraft fire at all have been encountered, but even where attempts were made, either by day or by night, to intercept our aircraft by either of these means, they have almost completely fai1ed.  Between 9/10th November, when 5 of our aircraft were lost in an attack on shipping at Akyab, and 20th December, only 1 other aircraft engaged on offensive operations was lost, and then the pilot was saved, Yet during this period, such operations were in progress, often for many consecutive days and. nights on end. 

Aircraft of the 10th U.S.A.A.F. from bases in India, also made 10 heavy raids on objectives in Burma and Bangkok during November and dropped some 150 tons of bombs.  American fighters also carried out constant offensive patrols and made effective low level attacks on Japanese troops.  

During December the U.S.A.A.F. made a further 13 raids, Rangoon and its important airfield being among the targets attacked.  It has also been revealed that American Squadrons are sending out 12 or more reconnaissance missions every day to observe the effects of raids, reconnoiter new targets and generally keep an eye on enemy movements. A typical task force of this nature may consist of one heavy aircraft together with a small fighter escort.  Bombs are carried and a watch kept for any suitable target which may present itself. 

In December the R.A.F., carried out 37 separate operations against the Japanese who, by comparison, only made 13 raids on Indian territory, losing 15 aircraft in the process, while  the R.A.F.  lost 12, the pilots of 6 of which were saved.   Objectives included. airfields at Toungoo, Magwe and Akyab among others; railway lines, locomotives and buildings were attacked at several locations including Mandalay; and rive traffic and communications, particularly in the Kaldan river area, were also constantly raided.  On December 16^th, a War Office communiqué announced an advance by out land forces from the Arakan border into Western Burma, and the occupation of the Maungdon Buthidaung area, about 60 miles north-east of Akyab.  By looking at the preceding communiqués, it was possible to see how the R.A.F. had anticipated this advance by patrolling and bombing villages and other objectives in the area concerned especially in the vicinity of Rhathedaung.  Since that time, bombers and fighters have kept up a constant activity in support of the advance.  Fighter patrols, of which the low-level machine-gun and cannon attack is becoming an ever more prominent feature, have been carried out; airfields raided; military objectives such as troops, transports, gun posts, buildings, oil tanks and railway installations attacked; the airfield, port, town and island of Aykab, shipping off the Arakan coast and river traffic on the Irrawaddy, Chindwin, Maya and Kaladan rivers bombed and machine gunned.     In the midst of all this, long range bombers made a 3-hour raid on Atheo in Central Burma on the 26^th/27^th December, showing that the R.A.F. was still being employed strategically as well as tactically, the 10^th U.S.A.A.F. has been no less active;  among other targets, the vital Mytigue road and railway bridges near Mandalay, key point of the enemy’s north to south communications in Central Burma was attacked and wrecked by American bombers on 10^th January.   

In the face of world-wide commitments, the R.A.F. has once more proved its ability to take the initiative.  Despite the vial necessity for retaining its hard-won mastery of the skies over Western Europe, and in the Middle East, it has been found possible to send what must have been substantial reinforcements to India for use in the air offensive over Burma.  Enough publicity has already been given to the immense work of organization and maintenance involved in sending aircraft and crews overseas in other connections;  it may however, be mentioned in passing that conditions, especially weather conditions in this theatre, are particularly trying on both men and machines, thus aggravating the problems already existing.  Striking features of the R.A.F. offensive over Burma are: the diversity of the tactics employed – day and night bombing, fighter sweeps, and low-level fighter bomber attacks – and the variety of targets chosen.  It has, furthermore, been estimated that whereas the Japanese are now dropping bombs on India by the hundredweight, we are dropped them on Burma by the ton.  The co-operation of the R.A.F. with the U.S.A.A.F. has been of higher order, and augurs well for the future.  The absence of serious opposition over many targets has helped in keeping our losses low, even negligible for long periods at a time; even when attempts have been made to intercept our aircraft or shoot them down, they have met with little or no success.  The close of the year 1942 contrasts favourable with its early days, when our fortunes in the Far East were at low ebb, and there are unmistakable signs that our air forces out there are beginning to be in a position to afford that support to our troops, which is the essential condition of the recovery of Burma from the Japanese.