A SHORT HISTORY

OF THE

1ST (WEST AFRICAN)
INFANTRY BRIGADE

IN THE

ARAKAN
1944-1945

captured. The possession of these boats also gave the Brigade Commander freedom to move portions of his infantry and other arms either across the river to the left bank or, by using any of the various channels into which the river was divided, to get them round enemy centres of resistance which could ,thus be assailed from the rear. The success of his operations, however, depended entirely upon the capture of BUTHIDAUNG and of SPONGE FINGER and VITAL CORNER, for without the first the boats could not be launched and without the second they could only move down stream by running the gauntlet of the known Japanese positions there.

In pursuit of his task of protecting the left flank of 25th (Indian) Division the Commander of 82nd (W.A.) Division directed 2nd (W.A.) Infantry Brigade to seize BUTHIDAUNG and two long features, known as WI~sT and EAST FINGEaS, south of that village. On completion of this task the Brigade was to put a bridgehead across the KALAPANZIN and cut off any Japanese withdrawing before the southward move of 4th Brigade who were to advance down the river from TAUNG BAZAAR.

The task assigned to 1st Brigade was, in conjunction with 2nd Brigade’s operations, to cross the KALAPANZ1N south of BUTHIDAUNG, seize SPONGE FINGER and VIT~

CORNER and then advance southwards to the SAINGDIN Chaung. Here the Brigade was to seize KINDAUNG and the hills across the chaung just south of that village and also to throw’ a bridgehead across the chaung near its confluence with the KALAPANZIN in order to facilitate the move by water’ of 53rd (Indian) Infantry Brigade. All the artillery resources of the Division, as well as. some of the Corps artillery, were put in support •of ‘both 1st and 2nd Brigades.

Such, broadly, was the plan for the first scene after the curtain had been rung up. It was expected that the erossing ‘of the KALAPANZIN would be disputed by the enemy and that he would react very violently to any threat to KINDAUNG, which lay at the end of the escape route along the’ SAINGDIN Chaung from the hills to the east.

The crossing was ordered to begin on the night lSth/l6th December. Before this could take place, however, it was essential that as much information as possible should be ibtained regarding the approaches to’ the river, the nature of the banks, the current (the KALAPANZIN was tidal at this point), the times of high and low water, the exits from the river on the far bank, etc. But, strange as it may appear, such information was remarkably difficult to

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‘obtain, either from records or by going and finding out. For reasons of secrecy, the movement of any~ African troops east of the RAZABIL area was forbidden, for it~,wp,s. hoped that the enemy had no knowledge of the arri’yal~ ~fl) the ARAKAN of a new African Division. Also for rea,~o~ of secrecy, patrols were not allowed to examine the nearet approaches to the river, let alone the river itself. The, information the Brigade had to rely on was that produced’ from a study of air photographs and ~through ‘~ V ‘!‘ Force channels, i.e., from the civil population., ..The result was a most conflicting mass, of information; some reports gave the average speed of the current as 6 to 8 knots, others as 2 to 3; some reports said ‘that theT only, period when assault boats could be got acr~oss was from two hours before until two hours after high or low water, ‘while others said that they could be paddled over’ at any, time. Air photographs gave some information regarding, the approaches to and exits from the river banks and

the approximate rise and fall of the tide But that ~‘as all. How much of all this information was correct will appear later

The forward concentration area allotted to the, Brigade was the HTINDAW BOWL, a small stretch - of pa not very far from BUTHIDAUNG. Further :to the e troops of 2nd Brigade were to assemble in preparation fQL their attack upon that village. 1st Brigade shared’, the HTINDAW BOWL with all sorts and conditions of Divisional :and Corps troops, and although the enemy artillery ha~ recently registered that area, he fortunately refrained, from ‘shelling it at the time when troops were as closely packed there as sardines are in a tin

On 12th December,’ 1944, the march from Riz~,aii. began. After going about half-way, ~the column ‘halted and, again in the interests of secrecy, completed concentra­tion in the Bowi.~ that night

The plan of the Brigade Commander was as follows:

A mule track ran from the BowL to INBAUK where the ~‘most forward troops of 25th (Indian) Division’ ‘wci~e located. This track was improved on’ 13th December’ to rpermit our carriers to move along it by night without, ‘it was hoped, too much interference from the “going ‘~ .1st Battalion Nigeria Regiment were to lead, with Brigade ‘Headquarters and 3rd Battalion Nigeria Regiment fol~àw­ing, and 2nd Battalion Nigeria Regiment bringing ‘up the rear. (The three battalions of the Brigad~ will hereafter be described as 1 N.R., 2 N.R. and 3’ N.R.) ~2 N.R. were not to move forward of INBAUK without the

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sanction of the Divis~onal Commander as they constituted’ his only reserve. 1 N.R. were also to act as advance guard’ as far as ‘BAGUNA EAST and thereafter ‘to secure the flanks of 3 N.R. when that battalion forced the crossing of the~ river. Once 3 N.R. had crossed, they were to establi~h a firm base on SPONGE FINGER and attack VITAL CORNER-from the south. 1 N.R. were to cross next and form a Brigade firm base on the hills’ east ‘of TJHLABYE while” 2 N.R., when released, passed through them and dealt with the SAINGDIN Chaung crossing. ‘ ‘‘ ‘ ‘

For the crossing of the KALAPANZIN the Brigade were” allotted 24 assault boats mark III and 18 rangers (inflatable~ rubber boats), all of which had to be carried on men’s heads~ from HTthDAW to the KALAPANZIN~ This task was given~ to the 5th (W.A.) Auxiliary Group’ (1~ereafter described, as 5 Aux. Gp.) ‘ whose men carried the assuult boats slung on one side in rope cradles hanging from’ transverse pieces of timber. ~Two men took post at the bows of ‘the boat, one on each side, ‘of, it, and two more -similarly at the stern.’ The boat’ was then lifted up, the’ transverse timbers put on their heads, and it was ‘then’ ready to be moved on. To carry it ~in~any’ other way was. impossible because of the narrowness of the track and the’ dense bush on either side. ‘ ‘. , ‘‘

In the early evening, of 13th December the Brigade’ began its march to INBAUK, all except the boat carriers. who ‘were to do the journey by ‘daylight next morning. At first all went well, but the gathering darkness, the density’ of the surrounding and overhanging bamboo, the winding’ nature of the mule track’ and its ‘sharp ascents and equally sudden and steep descents sooü made ‘marching extremely’ difficult.’ Indeed it was so’ dark at times that nobody knew whether the path went up or down, to right or to~ left or straight on. It was bad enough for the ordinary soldier unencumbered with a load on hjsheadbut how the’ carriers mahaged it is beyond comprehension.

2 N.R. in rear of this long column, ,findipg themselves the victims of every one of the various checks which occurred during this march, at lepgth wisely decided to halt and stay ‘put until the, morning. In ~the event, no-time was lost by their decision to halt where they were..’ Dawn on’ 14th December foqnd the rest of the column in and about INBAUK, with no casualties to troops but some’ loads had got damaged through the occasional carrier” taking a toss.

The attack by 2nd Brigade went in according to plan, and as soon as they had cleared WEST FINGER and were

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moving upon EAST FINGER, the 1st Brigade received’ orders to start. 1 N.R., as advance guard, set off with the ‘objective of BAGUNA EAsT, but detached. one compaI~y and_

a section of morta .,.aorth of a chiü~ig skirting the southern’ ends of the two FINGERS. A fighting patrol from this battalion was also sent to, the high’ ground south of the line of advance in order to see that no: enemy force ,o,f any size was located in the foothills ‘there. The,) ma~m body of 1 N.R. proceeded on its way without incidentbut the ieftjlan,k compai~y_(” o~pany) were heldiup~,.r a. short time by opposition on’ the southern end of EAs’~’ FINGER. This was cleared by the company, in conjunction with 1st Battalion Gold, Coast Regiment .of’ 2nd~ Brigaci? and by the afternoon the battalion was concentia,ted’J. BAGUNA EAST. The patrol to the;foothills had alsohad!a smart engagement. Their leading: scouts located~enemy in position and an atten~ptto . outflank them only-’ succeeded in drawing fire from other, enemy positAons sited ~ ~eQy’e~~ the ~post first encountered., None ..the ., less, by skilful mano~uvre, the patrol’ commander was able’ to inflictf~pm twelve to fifteen casualties ‘upon the Japanese be~ore,:;he was recalled to his battalion with his’ patrol. :~ 7.

The iemainder of the Brigade moved that day to BAGIThA WEST, except foi 2 N R, who remained in Divisional reserve at INBAUK. ‘That night a selected party from 3 N.R. were sent forward with reconnaissance~ boats to try and cross the river and from an advanced base on the slopes of SPONGE FINGER. Owing to. their up~voidably late start. due to a breakdown in the’~ arrangements far ‘guides and to the excessively ‘poor visibility’ this: party failed in its attempt and rejoined its unit next day’ at BAGUNA EAST, whither the Brigade, still without ~

had moved early on the morning of 15th December. ,,

The day was spent in making preparations for’ the ‘crossing ordered for that night. ‘ This involved the’ carriage forward of boats by concealed’ routes, marking the’ route from BAGUNA, EAST to the river bank, allotment” of troops ‘to craft, arranging the’ final details of’ the fire ‘plan (although the crossing was to be a ‘~ilent one, covering “fire on possible enemy centres of resistance ‘had naturally ‘to be settled), and all the multifarious preparations’ necessary for a task of such a nature. It should be b’orne in mind that the KALAPANZIN was 300 yards wide at the’ point ‘selected for crossing which was opposite and slightly south

-of the village of YWETNYODAUNG.              ,

At dusk 3 N.R. set off towards the river in preparation ‘for the crossing which was to begin at about 2200 ‘,hours.

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This time was chosen as it was two hours before high water and’ according to infOrmation the current would be’ negligible. In” di!Le course the first flight of boats, holding; about one company, set off. But the current, far from being almost inert, was running swiftly upstream with the tide, and of the fifteen or so boats which started only two succeeded in getting back to their starting point. To’ add to the difficulties, the fog grew thicker and it was. decided that no further attempts to cross should be made’ until the dawn. The night was’ bitterly cold, the tide rose over the paddy-fields bordering the river and little sleep-was had by the troops who had expected to cross the river that night. Reserve boats were brought down to the river’ bank in readiness for the dawn and as soon as it was light enough to see fifty yards through the fog, the crossing; began once again. The leading troops, contrary to all expectations, met no resistance on the further bank and by nightfall had established themselves on SPONGE FING

with the leading elements of 1 ~.R. Jorming a cbs

bridge,h~ea~,~QunLthe_point,,p~disembarkation on the east bank. ,The only enemy reaction to the crossing was some~ most inaccurate shelling which was so wide that it did not cause any interruptio~ L4ieJarwa~d, ,m.av.e~f our troops. and only succeeded iz~, killing one water buffa~) There was never ,any slack” waterT on’ this”rivèr~’ The tide turneci almost’ in the twinkling of an eye and very soon developed. a current of five knots.

On 17th December, 3 N.R. moved nOrthwards upon. VITAL CORNER ‘which ‘ they occupied, again without opposition, the ‘enemy having withdrawn southwards down the road fjj KINDAUNG.” This battalion, also made contact. with 2nd Brigade’ who by this time had established a

bridgehead at BUTHIDAUNG. Orders were now received to proceed with~ all speed ‘to seize a bridgehead across the SAINGDIN Chaung near its junction with the KALAPANZIN. 1 N.R. were directed to’ their firm - base in the area south-east of UHLABYE, with a’ company remaining to. cover the crossing of the rest of- the Brig~de. 2 N.R., now released from Divisional reserve, were directed to throw their bridgehead over, the SAINODIN Chaung due’ south of THEINDkUNG. Moving partly by~ water and partly acros’s country, - “A” Company and one platoon of “D” Company established themselves rapidly. .on the south bank of the chaung’by. the. evening of the 17th December. .The~ enemy reaction to this move was immediate, and thereafter the bridgehead and the north bank of the chaung were subjected to accurate and frequont ‘shelling by three or four 75 mm. guns.

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Next day, 18th December, the bridgehead was increased to three companies and a ‘troop of 104 Mortar Battery. The enemy continued to shell, both banks of the chaung and also the boats. One’ direct hit was scored on the only powered boat available and seven Africans of the Mortar Battery were thrown into the chaung and drowned, Patrols feeling forward found that the enemy were in ocd’upation of DODAN, which commanded the exits from the bridgehead. An attack on the village,’ supported by artillery and mortars, failed to drive out the ‘enemy, although the leading troops of 2 N.R. got amongst’ the houses. Dusk was now falling and .as the exact ‘enemy’ strength was not known, and’ the village was quite unfamiliar to our troops, it was decided to withdraw back to the bridgehead. Three enemy machine-guns had been identified in DODAN. That night fire from medium; ‘ field and light artillery was put down on DODAN and ~next morning, 19th December, another company’ went forward to the attack. This was also unsuccessful, ‘the enemy gunners bringing down heavy and’ accurate defensive’ fire upon the attackers. The completely open nature. of the country round DODAN favoured the defence and in : the course of this attack it was discovered that the enemy were now in possession of at least one. medium ‘and ‘seven light machine-guns, having reinforced their garrison from

HP0NNY0LEIK. ‘

A pause ensued and was followed by half-an-bour’~ concentration by all artillery and mortars on’ the ~village and also an air strike. A company again ‘attacked under cover of this bombardment but ‘ once again’ the attack failed to dislodge the Japanese from their deep dug-outs and heavily constructed bunkers

During all this, other troops of 2 N R had been moved pa~tly by water and partly on foot, hugging the. river bank, to SE-0GYAYwA’from whence, they were directed upon THAZINDAW and SANYWINDU to get in behind the enemy and cut him off. A small skirmish took~ ‘place “at SE-OGYAYWA whence a patrol of the enemy were driven out, one African soldier calmly walking up to a’tree and’ shooting out of it a Japanese sniper who was causing casualties .~to his comrades in the open paddy

This flanking force was gradually built up from the bridgehead tthops, who were still being subjected.to enemy artillery fire and sniping by Japanese patrols. A. special wo,rd of praise is due to a small party of paddlers drawn from’ 5. Aux.. Gp. . who throughout, this period and despite the enemy’s shelling never once liesita ted in their task . of

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ferrying .trqops, ‘supplies, etc., across the chaung. One of them, Private Aura Lamurde, was subsequently awarded the Military Medal for his gallantry but unfortunately was killed at a later date before he knew of his award.

The route SE-OGYAYWA—THAZINDAW-—-SANYWiNDU looked, innocent enough on the map. In point of fact it was a succession of relatively narrow but very deep tidal chaungs with thick, black, oozy mud constituting their banks. The troops overcame all these obstacles and some enemy resistance and eventually, on 22nd December, succeeded in clearing DODAN and also HPONNYOLEIK and exploiting to Pt. 268, on the feature known as STOREY. It was an action which called for considerable determina­tion and gallantry and earned the’ first .D.S.O., to be awarded in the Division.

Meantime the rest of the Brigade had not been idle. Brigade Headquarters had moved on 18th December to KYAUKHTAYAN and 1 N.R. were directed to seize ‘the southernmost tip of the high ground just north of KINDAUNG and also the village of .that name. Here the first Japanese prisoner to be captured by the Division -fell into the hands of 1 N.R. Some slight enemy activity ‘in’ this. village was quickly eliminated and on 19th December” 0.’! Company erossd she, ,&AINGDIN Chaung using four extremely~rickety native canoes. They established themselves “on the high ,groiiI-i’dmort’h of the road by nightfall without opposition, and that night were subjected to their first “jitter-party.” ‘The behaviour of the troops, ,in this their first action, was highly commendable and only ~one shot was fired by them that night. .This was fired by an African who suddenly found a foreign body within a yard of the end of his rifle. The score was one round, one dead Japanese, and one light machine-gun captured.

Next day, 20th December, “C” Company exploited ,and consolidated, while “A” Company ‘passed through them and worked their way southwards through the thick jungle in spite of opposition from enemy snipers and small parties who attempted to stop their advance. This company was also heavily jittered that night but, like “C” Company, remained perfectly calm and collected. The whole of this large feature (MARKER) was eventually

-cleared on 21st December,’ and one platoon occupied the high ground just east of the ‘pass through the hills. Enemy

artillery had also been active on this sector of the front and one 105 mm. Howitzer dropped’a number of shells into the battalion’s .Advanced Dressing Station. near Battalion Headquarters but without much’ effect.

- ~ ‘~‘

A special patrol from 1 N.R. went up the SAINGDIN Chaung and, although fierce opposition was encounteredl on the first two days, the patrol eventually succeeded ‘in reaching its destination which was the junction of’ that chaung with the RI Chaung. . .

The Brigade was now disposed as follows :— Brigade Headquarters, 3 N.R.,

1st Field Ambulance, Head- . . /

quarters 5 Aux. Gp., 102 Light KYAUKHTAYAN’

Regiment (in support), 104 -

Mortar Battery (in support),

2 Field Company.

          1 N R                                             MARKER

          2N.R.            ..           ..           .. ST’bBEY

The casualties exceeded 100, over 80 being sufferedin 2 N.R. alone in their operations round DODAN. ...It~is interesting to record that the casualties in these few days’ fighting were about the same ‘as those sustained’ by this Brigade in their whole East African ‘campaign’in’ 1941-42.

The southward advance of the Division down the axis of the road was now taken over by 4th~ Brigade who’ ‘had cleared the enemy between. TAUNG BAZAAR and BUTHIDAUNG and had moved in 1st Brigade’s wake to KINDATJNG., 1st Brigade’s task was not yet over,, for 3’ N.R.. (lesp, tW9 companies) were sent by water, from KYAUKH~AYA~ ,~9 seize ZEDIDATJNG, threaten the enemy’line of cornmunic~ tions in front of 4th Brigade’s advance and also to secu~e the left flank of 53rd (Indian). Brigade which-was, now operating on the west bank of the KALAPANZIN. For this ‘operation a small advance’ party set off in powered Burley boats, being followed by the remainder of the column’,in native sampans and “khties,” . propelled by oars ‘ and sweeps and manned by Arakanese civilians who formed part of the I.W.T. fleet. The Burley’ boats successfully reached their objective, some two or three miles. west of ZEDIDATJNG, under cover of the morning, fog,’ but. the sampan and “kisti” fleet, being much slower craft, missed the fog and came under enemy artillery fire at the point where the SHANMABAUK leaves the KALAPANZIN, which now becomes the MAYU River. The Ara.kanese crews immediately pulled their boats into the east bank of the SHANMABATJK and decamped into the paddy and under­growth. The immobilised boats continued .to be subjected to shell fire and one or two direct hits were obtained by the enemy and casualties inflicted. The troops were accordingly disembarked and took u~ a defensive position

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while search was made for the crews, without effect. It

•was then decided to carry on without the Arakanese, so the troops re-embarked and tried their best with the unaccustomed oars and sweeps. This measure succeeded in bringing, out of the earth itself as it were, the crews who preferred to risk the shelling rather than lose their boats and so the journey continued without further adventure. Some high ground to the north of ZEDIDAUN~ wqs occupied that day without opposition but by night a party of Japanese got into the village itself and occupied previously prepared positions. The approach, to the village from the north was narrow and would not allow for the deployment of more than the one platoon which was used to eject them. Some progress was made but the enemy’s positions were sited with his usual thorough­ness and much difficulty ,was encountered in clearing the village. That night however the enemy slipped away by swimming the chaung and joined some of their comrades who, were causing trouble to a battalion of the York and

A Lancaster Regiment operating from KWAZON Island. On

- /           25th December, this column of 3 N.R. exploited east to a point which overlooks the road and soon established contact with 4th Brigade.

From now onwards little of interest occurred for a few days, except that a special patrol from 2 N.R. was

despatched up a reputed track to the KALADAN, The track, even at this stage of the dry season, was quite out of the question for any large column and was unfit for mules, let alone jeeps. By wading through deep chaungs and climbing precipitous hills the patrol on 2nd January came in sight of APAUKWA on the KALADAN and found themselves 15 miles south of the leading troops of 81st (W.A.) Division which was operating down the axis of that river. An alternative route back to the KALAPANZIN was only negotiated by scaling sheer cliff faces with the aid of improvised bamboo ladders. The patrol, which had set off on 28th December, rejoined 2 N.R. on 5th January, having covered some 80 miles and seen no sign of the enemy.

4th Brigade were now preparing to move through the hills from the H~izwa area to KANZAUK and the KALADAN with a view to passing under command of 81st (W.A.) Division for their operations on MYOHAUNG. On 2nd January, therefore, 1 N.R. took over the western end of the pass, known by the Division as LUKE, sent patrols as far as RATHEDAUNG and’ established two forward companies, “B” at AWRAMA ‘.and “D” at HKAMWE, where the Japanese had built a jeepable road to the KALADAN

1’O

valley. The rest of 1st Brigade concentrated in the western end of LUKE and awaited orders to follow 4th Brigade to

the KALADAN. ,                                                       , -

The period was spent in patrolling, building up a supply dump at HKAMWE, resting, training and examining the lessons of the preceding iJ.ays of the campaign. The most satisfactory facts which emerged were the soundness of the previous training, the excellent manner in which all concerned had passed through the tests and trials of what was, to all intents and purposes, their first campaign, for it was almost three years since anybody had been in action before and those who had done so formed a relatively small percentage of the total. ‘It was, therefore, a matter of no surprise that the Brigade looked forward with complete confidence to whatever the future might hold in store.

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